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Abstract 
 
The failure to eradicate poverty through trade-induced economic growth over a number 
of decades raises questions about the latest initiative: Aid-for-trade. After examining 
whether the initiative signifies a new paradigm for achieving development, this thesis 
employs an empirical analysis of the East Asian region with a particular focus on 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to find no clear relationship between 
Aid-for-trade flows and measures of development even for individual sectors in these 
countries. It is concluded that this is due to Aid-for-trade flows being designed to 
maximise the donor’s economic and political position rather than the recipient’s 
development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The start of the 21
st
 Century has not heralded the eradication of poverty through trade-
induced economic growth. However, even though this has not prompted change in the 
over-arching mainstream economic wisdom that sees trade as a powerful engine for 
economic growth (OEDC and WTO, 2011: 21) the agenda has been reorientated to 
emphasise development, globalisation, poverty reduction and sustainability to revitalise 
the Doha Round negotiation process. Disappointment following the implementation of 
the Uruguay Round, lack of substance on special and differential treatment, delays, 
unfulfilled promises on tariff- and quota-free treatment for developing countries and the 
mounting empirical studies presenting evidence on welfare losses from possible Doha 
packages pointed to the asymmetry in the way developed and developing countries were 
affected by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade negotiations (Laird, UNCTAD, 
2007: 1). Furthermore, the 2008-2010 global economic downturn and the food and 
energy crises (Hoekman and Nicita, 2010: 66) were major setbacks in the poverty 
reduction agenda that forms part of the Millennium Declaration, prompting the 
recognition that “without a major push forward, many of the MDG targets are likely to 
be missed in most regions” (UN, 2010:4).  
In this context, the Aid-for-trade initiative has emerged as the focus. It has been 
used as a catch-all term for types of trade-related Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to help developing countries generate supply-side responses to liberalisation. 
The surrounding debate sees a reversal of the old perspective that can be broadly 
summarised as “trade, not aid”, recognising that there is a need for assistance to enable 
developing countries to expand and diversify their trade in a manner that deepens the 
development impact and attracts foreign direct investment (FDI). In other words, the 
emerging view is that aid should help to develop trade, so that eventually trade can 
replace aid (Laird, UNCTAD, 2007: 2). In December 2005, the Sixth Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong created a new WTO work programme on the Aid-for-trade 
initiative. A Task Force produced a set of recommendations, endorsed in 2006, giving a 
monitoring role to the WTO (WTO, 2011). The World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also assumed participation 
in this development agenda, suggesting that borrowing, accompanied by their 
specialised advice, is a form of assistance or “Aid-for-trade”, if not “aid” in the 
narrower interpretation of ODA (UN, 2010: 4). Despite broad consensus regarding the 
importance of addressing the needs of developing countries, there is nevertheless a lack 
of agreement as to what these needs are and the way the funds will be disbursed.  
The aim of this paper is to determine whether or not the Aid-for-trade initiative 
has achieved or can achieve its development objectives. In undertaking this task, the 
thesis begins with a literature review discussing the development of economic theory 
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that forms the theoretical foundations of the Aid-for-trade initiative. This is conducted 
to assess whether Aid-for-trade signifies a reorientation in the dominant paradigm, or is 
merely a reframing of the orthodox approach that trade liberalisation is the best way 
forward for any country seeking to develop. The initiative is then situated in relation to 
existing literature on economic growth and development through trade and FDI, with 
the application of competing explanations for development in East Asia. Next, to 
determine whether or not Aid-for-trade is a genuine new initiative, this thesis considers 
three factors: first, the history of the WTO in assisting developing countries with trade-
related issues; second, the genesis of the Aid-for-trade initiative; and third, the 
relationship between Aid-for-trade, the Doha Development Round and Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), followed by the identification of Aid-for-trade’s main 
objectives as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (2006), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and WTO (2011). Next, an 
assessment of the initiative’s impact across and within developing nations in East Asia 
will be undertaken, identifying factors that shape the efficacy Aid-for-trade in achieving 
its key goals, economic growth and increase in exports, and its wider development 
goals. This paper seeks to critique the mainstream neoliberal-neoclassical arguments 
articulated by the World Bank, IMF, WTO and the ADB through an evaluation of 
whether external assistance of the kind proposed under the Aid-for-trade initiative 
should be used to address the targeted developing countries’ needs. Given the fact that 
most developing countries have received large amounts of aid and liberalised trade 
significantly since the 1980s or early 1990s but not all have managed to reap a large 
growth dividend (Morrissey, 2006: 78), this thesis examines the reasons for the 
continued reaffirmation of conventional wisdom. In short, this thesis critically explores 
the question: Is Aid-for-trade nothing more than the old liberalisation agenda  
in new terms? 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 undertakes a literature review, 
providing an overview of the economic theories relating to development, economic 
growth and trade to set up the context for analysing the Aid-for-trade initiative (2.1). 
This is followed by the application of competing explanations for the economic success 
in East Asia (2.2) and the discussion of the origins, scope and key aims of the Aid-for-
trade initiative (2.3). In Chapter 3, two empirical studies are conducted: cross-country 
analysis (3.1) and country-specific analysis (3.2). Cross-country analysis tested the key 
propositions regarding beneficial effects of greater ODA and liberalised trade 
underpinning the Aid-for-trade against key variables linked to growth, economic 
development and welfare. Country-specific analysis assessed the effectiveness of Aid-
for-trade on achieving its primary goals - increased growth in targeted sectors and 
exports – by examining the size and direction of the Aid-for trade flows to identify the 
top ten sectors that should have experienced the greatest amount of growth and 
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development in comparison to the actual growth profile of the different sectors 
benefitting from Aid-for-trade. An attempt is made at explaining any discrepancies in 
the effects of Aid-for-trade found during this comparison, with a view to determining 
whether or not the initiative has achieved its objectives in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 
examines factors influencing the efficacy of Aid-for-trade on economic growth and 
exports, in particular variations of objectives for providing trade-related ODA, 
including tied aid (4.1.1) and production networks (4.1.2); and variations in the 
composition of exports and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between countries (4.2). 
Chapter 5 discusses factors shaping the efficacy of Aid-for-trade on economic 
development in Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (5.1), specifically foreign 
ownership of enterprises benefiting from Aid-for-trade (5.2), social phenomena not 
captured by conventional poverty statistics (5.3), the ethnic dimensions of employment 
in different sectors and poverty (5.4) and the environmental considerations of the 
sustainability of export-led growth (5.5). Chapter 6 concludes that Aid-for-trade is not 
directed in ways that maximise the recipients’ development and suggests possible 
avenues for re-conceptualising the initiative. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of the economic theories 
relating to development, growth and trade. The main aim is to set the context for the 
analysis of the Aid-for-trade initiative, pre-empting an approach that will then inform 
the empirical study conducted in this paper. The exercise will contribute to determining 
whether or not the Aid-for-trade initiative is indeed a change in the mainstream 
theoretical and policy paradigm. The literature review consists of three interlinked parts. 
The first part reviews theoretical approaches to the problem of development, seeking to 
draw on existing research literature on growth and trade. The second part takes a 
regional perspective of East Asia and evaluates the application of competing theories to 
interpret and analyse the process of development in the region. The third part focuses on 
organising, integrating and evaluating published policy literature to identify the origin 
and rationale behind the Aid-for-trade initiative and consider the progress of defining 
the scope of such trade-related ODA. The importance of examining the theory is 
twofold: Not only does theory provide a framework for interpreting the development 
process but it also serves as the basis of policy recommendations adopted by 
international financial institutions and donor countries in their advice provided to 
developing countries (World Bank and CEPR, 2011: 9).  
2.1 Theory 
2.1.1 Development  
 
The relationship between development, economic growth, trade, and poverty reduction 
has been the subject of debate among academics, international and non-governmental 
organisations, and policy-makers for a considerable period of time. It is well-known that 
all definitions are contextual and contingent upon the ideological, epistemological or 
methodological orientation of their purveyors. While in the nineteenth century the term 
“development” was associated with ideas of stewardship and “progress” from poverty 
and barbarism to riches and civilisation (Shanin, 1997: 65), since the late 1960s the 
dominant paradigm has been modernisation theory, grafted onto the orthodox neoliberal 
framework (Simon, 1997: 184). Modernisation theory asserts that development is a 
linear stage-by-stage transformation of all “traditional” agrarian societies into “modern” 
or “developed” societies through economic growth which involves replacing traditional 
practices with Western norms and institutions through international economic relations 
(Cohn, 2008: 85; Easterly, 2009: 373). Notwithstanding the absence of a clear 
definition, the concept of development attracted strong beliefs in what the notion is 
supposed to bring about, appealing both to those who desire an improvement in their 
socio-economic living conditions and those with a strong commitment to international 
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social justice (Rist, 2007: 486). As Hayter notes, “there was little attempt ... to define 
development. Instead, there was an unquestioned assumption ... that ‘development’, 
whatever it was, could lead to improvement in the situation of poor people” (Hayter, 
2005: 89). Therefore, the extensive use of the term development has created the 
perception that it was not a social construct, buzzword or an outcome of political will, 
but rather a natural eventuality of an innately existing world order which was both 
universally desirable and just.  
Thus, development became a performative word (Rist, 2007: 486) whereby any 
measure, such as facilitating FDI, raising or lowering trade barriers, or education and 
training campaigns, was justified and legitimised by claims that they were “geared to 
improving the lives of poor people” (Rist, 2007: 486). However, this optimistic 
conceptualisation of development has been questioned by dependency theory which 
argues that external factors in the global sphere, rather than domestic inefficiencies, 
constrain development in the “periphery” (Cohn, 2008: 102). Moreover, dependency 
theory not only suggests that the periphery became underdeveloped as a result of its 
interactions with the core, but also the development of the capitalist economies in the 
core is contingent on the underdevelopment of the periphery. Thus modernisation 
theory and dependency theory offer contrasting visions of the path of development, 
barriers to development and the role of economic activity. 
An underlying theme of the discussion regarding the process of development has 
been the concept of “globalisation”. The term globalisation is generally used to describe 
an increasing internationalisation and interdependency of markets, the means of 
production, financial systems, competition, corporations and technology, giving rise to 
increasing flows of capital and labour and faster propagation of technological 
innovations through an increasing amount of cross-border trade (IMF, OECD et al, 
2002; Fischer, 2003: 3; World Bank, 2002: 1). The process of globalisation has been 
broadly divided into eras, with the current era from 1980 to the present, characterised by 
technological advances in transport and communications and by “the choice of large 
developing countries to improve their investment climates” by opening to foreign trade 
and investment (World Bank, 2002: 3-5; Dowrick and Golley, 2004). Moreover, 
globalisation is credited for bringing about widespread development through the linkage 
between economic growth and poverty reduction (Chandy and Getz, 2011), echoing the 
sentiment expressed earlier by the World Bank (World Bank, 2002). Thus, the 
mainstream paradigm sees development in economic terms, underpinned by 
globalisation as a positive force stimulating innovation and technological progress, with 
any solution for a country lagging behind necessarily coming by economic means.  
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2.1.2 Economic Growth and Trade 
 
Classical economic analysis predicted that a country could develop through the 
specialisation of labour and capital accumulation. Specialisation suggests that countries 
differ in their ability to produce commodities and services and consequently they should 
focus on the goods that they can produce more efficiently (Smith, 2008: 88). Thus, in 
classical economic theory the basic factors of production that determine comparative 
advantage and the export structure of an economy are natural resources, capital and 
labour. Smith hinted that the greater the market, the greater the capacity of people to 
utilise their natural propensity for barter and exchange (Smith, 2008: 91). Ricardo 
embraced this idea in the theory of comparative advantage, proposing that if exchange 
was to take place between countries, then those countries will benefit economically 
from trade by concentrating on the production of the commodities at which they are 
relatively better off than their respective trading partners (Stilwell, 2008: 81).  
The neoclassical view on the role of capital accumulation is represented by the 
Solow-Swan model. The key prediction was that every economy would ultimately 
experience zero growth in per capita incomes because eventually the diminishing 
marginal returns on capital would force GDP growth to be equal to population growth 
plus technology growth.
1
 This culminated in the work of Romer (1989) who postulated 
that despite the initial rise in GDP through the reallocation of resources to more 
productive sectors, the long-run prospects for growth in a closed economy are 
ultimately determined by the resources that are allocated to the sector that produces the 
new intermediate inputs or tools (Romer, 1989: 14). Thus, Romer’s model had very 
strong implications for the beneficial effects of liberalised trade which can increase the 
rate of technological progress, and hence productivity growth, through the expansion of 
the market for intermediate or capital goods, offering a “clear interpretation of why 
import-substitution strategies are dominated by export-promotion” (Romer, 1989: 17; 
Borland and Yang, 1992).  
2.1.3 Trade Liberalisation 
 
The discussion above outlined the theoretical framework for the positive effects of trade 
liberalisation. However, for the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to clarify, what 
does trade liberalisation mean? Trade openness can be conceptualised in two ways: 
“revealed openness” and “policy openness” (Dowrick and Golley, 2004: 40). Revealed 
openness is the ratio of total foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP and is most 
frequently employed in empirical studies because it has the advantage of being clearly 
                                                 
1
 This theoretical result was validated by the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model which considered capital 
accumulation with optimising agents and a global steady state was reached where income per capita was 
stable and agents saved a specific proportion of their current income. 
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defined and well-measured. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not offer 
an explanation of the reason why some countries trade more than others (Dowrick and 
Golley, 2004: 40). Policy openness is an alternative measure attempting to take these 
factors into account but it is difficult to find a reliable measure because it ranges from 
analysing trade barriers (such as non-tariff barriers and the average tariff level) to trade 
flows adjusted for structural characteristics such as size and natural resources (Pritchett, 
1996). A constructed measure of policy openness is the Frankel-Romer measure which 
has been used in the influential studies by Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). This has the advantage of being related only to 
geography, which is a “key determinant of climate, endowment of natural resources, 
disease burden, transport costs, and diffusion of knowledge and technology from more 
advanced areas” (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004: 1). However, due to its 
constructed nature it cannot offer insights into the contribution of actual policies to trade 
flows and economic performance (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004: 4).  
2.2 Application: Export-Led Growth in East Asia 
 
Multiple studies have made efforts to show that liberalised trade may be linked to 
higher economic growth. Dollar (1992), Edwards (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) all 
argue that trade openness is clearly associated with more rapid economic growth. 
Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1999) argue that in-depth country analyses have shown that 
trade does seem to create, and also sustain, higher economic growth. In particular, those 
in favour of trade liberalisation point to the notable economic growth prior to the Asian 
Financial Crisis (see Table 2.1) in East Asia, observing that countries with export-
oriented policies have grown faster than those with “inward-oriented policies that block 
integration and discourage competition” (IMF, 2006: 6). East Asia features four 
countries which have experienced a relatively consistent period of economic growth 
since the 1970s: Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore have displayed long-term 
average annual economic growth rates from 3.9% to 5.1% over the period 1975 to 2003. 
The average annual growth rates of other Southeast Asian countries have been less 
impressive, with the Philippines stagnating to 0.3% throughout the same period of time 
(UNDP, 2005).  
Critiques of the mainstream argument for trade as an engine of growth emerged, 
with structural-institutionalist and core-periphery arguments pointing to interventionist 
state policies, rather than market liberalisation in explaining the economic success in 
East Asia (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Lucarelli, 2002).  
Thus, even though there have been numerous attempts to examine the causative link 
between trade and growth, both advocates and critics of the mainstream approach tend 
to use selective evidence in relation to constructing data, thus producing disagreements 
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over the factors that have promoted growth (Gereffi, 1989: 506; Burkett and Hart-
Landsberg, 1998a: 435; Burkett and Hart-Landsberg, 2000: 223). 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Comparison of Economic Growth Rates Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis 
Countries 
Average 
1978-
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Average 
1988-
1995 
          All 
Developing 
Countries 
 
4.5 5.3 4.3 4.3 5.2 6.3 6.2 6.4 5.5 
Africa 
 
2.1 3.6 3.4 2.1 1.7 0.7 0.7 2.4 2.2 
Western 
Developing  
Countries
a 
 
3.1 1.1 1.6 1.1 3.3 2.9 3.1 4.7 2.4 
Indonesia 
 
5.2 5.8 9.1 9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.9 
Malaysia 
 
5.5 8.9 9.2 9.7 8.6 7.8 8.3 9.2 8.9 
Thailand 
 
6.4 13.3 12.2 11.6 8.4 7.9 8.4 8.6 9.9 
Republic of 
Korea 
 
7.7 11.3 6.4 9.5 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.4 8.1 
Taiwan 
 
8.6 7.3 7.5 4.9 9.2 6.5 6.3 6.4 6.8 
Hong Kong 
 
8.3 8.0 2.6 3.4 5.1 6.3 6.4 5.4 5.3 
Singapore 6.9 11.1 9.6 8.8 6.7 6.0 10.1 10.1 8.9 
                    
Source: International Monetary Fund (1996:121-23). 
a
 All countries in the Western Hemisphere except the United States and Canada. 
 
In particular, the orthodox neoclassical-neoliberal approach focuses on export-
oriented industrialisation, or export-led growth on the basis that increased trade 
competition is the crux of the East Asian model of development and the explanation for 
its economic success (Schmidt, 2003: 67). Mainstream economists supporting the 
neoliberal agenda in favour of increased trade liberalisation and competition articulated 
by the World Bank, WTO and the IMF tend to focus on Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia, arguing that their economic success was due to liberalised market activity 
and FDI (World Bank, 1993: 1). Using an amalgam of the “flying geese” model with 
the product cycle theory as the basis for this view, mainstream economists see Japan’s 
role in East Asia as the focal point, fostering a more competitive, inter-dependent 
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environment whereby countries sequentially adopt the Japanese model of development 
and Japanese-style management (Sing, 2003: xii). During a period of 35 years starting 
from the early 1960s, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore followed the example 
of Japan’s economic transformation between 1952 and 1973, transforming from 
technologically backward and poor countries to “newly industrialised economies” 
(NIEs). The mainstream view is that there is a pattern of industrial diffusion through 
trade stemming from Japan, to the NIEs, to ASEAN
2
 and most recently to China 
(Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995: 174; Burkett and Hart-Landsberg, 1998b: 87; Nelson and 
Pack, 1999; Chamon and Kremer, 2006). The phenomenon of progressive 
specialisation, it is argued, allows firms to respond to competitive pressures and 
progress from specialising in simple goods to technologically advanced capital goods if 
trade is as free as possible (World Bank, 2005: 29). Moreover, corresponding to the 
theoretical postulates relating to technology transfers through trade discussed in 
Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, the product-cycle model suggests that Japan’s ODA helps to 
upgrade technology (Kohama, 2003: 9) and agricultural development. It also sees ODA 
as a catalyst for FDI and industrial agglomeration and development in Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore (Omura, 2003: 103). 
In contrast to the orthodox framework, structural-institutionalist and core-
periphery arguments point to interventionist state policies, rather than market 
liberalisation in explaining economic success in East Asia (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; 
Wade, 1992: 285). Furthermore, attention is drawn to Japan and Korea, where an 
import-substitution approach was used, based on state industrial planning, import 
barriers, capital controls and, in some circumstances, enforced by military repression 
(Amsden, 1989; Choi, 1993: 99; Brohman, 1996: 107-30). Similar dynamics were found 
in the other NIEs
3
 (Lucarelli, 2002: 502; OECD, 1979). For instance, despite the World 
Bank’s proposition that Korea’s comparative advantage lay in textiles, Korea was able 
to establish strong steel and automotive industries. The key to economic growth in this 
case was not trade liberalisation but state-orchestrated use of economic resources, 
shifting its industrial priorities (Amsden, 1989: 116). This evidence counters the 
teleological prediction of the orthodox framework that it is through export-led growth, 
based on comparative advantage, that countries reach a “mature” stage of development. 
Moreover, contrary to the theory of progressive specialisation, the production and 
exports of East Asian countries remained greatly dependent on the imports of capital 
goods and technologies from Japan throughout the 1990s (Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995: 
206). Likewise, ASEAN has been Japan’s important supplier of raw materials, 
                                                 
2
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organisation that was formed in 
1967.  The organisation is currently made up of ten Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei; Vietnam joined in 1995, and Burma and Laos were 
admitted in 1997. 
3
 The NIEs are Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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production base for manufacturing industries with lower-cost labour and a market for 
manufactures; indeed for ASEAN the percentage of total trade with Japan exceeded that 
of trade with the United States throughout the 1980s (see Table 2.2, last row). 
 
Table 2.2 
Trade Interdependence Among Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region 
(Share of Total Trade of the Individual Countries, %) 
 Years Japan United States NIEs ASEAN-4 
      
Japan 1980 
1987 
1988 
 24.2 
36.5 
33.8 
14.8 
17.2 
18.8 
7.0 
4.1 
4.9 
 
United States 
 
1980 
1987 
1988 
 
9.4 
11.2 
11.8 
  
6.7 
9.3 
10.9 
 
2.8 
2.3 
2.2 
 
NIEs
a 
 
1980 
1987 
1988 
 
10.3 
11.2 
12.2 
 
24.6 
29.8 
27.8 
 
9.7 
10.0 
10.8 
 
10.6 
8.0 
8.2 
 
ASEAN-4
b 
 
1980 
1987 
1988 
 
28.4 
23.7 
23.6 
 
 
19.0 
22.3 
22.2 
 
16.3 
18.9 
19.6 
 
4.4 
4.2 
3.6 
a
 Newly Industrialising Economies: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
b
 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Source: Sing, 2003:155, ASEAN, 2010. 
 
Such evidence suggests that rather than Japanese firms vacating sectors which 
have achieved “maturity,” a new regional division of labour has been established, based 
on regionalised production networks and supply chains (Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995: 
207). Production networks involve production fragmentation, where cross-border 
dispersion of component production and assembly within vertically integrated 
production processes occurs and each country specialises in a particular stage of the 
sequence (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006). This increases the necessity of importing 
intermediate inputs from partner countries to produce outputs. This reveals an 
asymmetrical structural dependency relationship inhibiting innovation because the 
Japanese suppliers of key technological inputs are also competitors, thus contributing to 
a delay in the supply of new technologies to ASEAN and affecting the speed with which 
new products are developed and marketed.  
Further, while Japan’s ODA providing agricultural and technological assistance 
may be conducive to development in East Asia, it is also likely to facilitate entrapment 
in particular industries. While the electronics manufacturing and export industries in 
East Asia (particularly the four NIEs) have acquired significant innovative capabilities 
that contributed to development, the same cannot be concluded about other industries, 
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such as large-scale capital goods and complex systems industries (Hobday, 1995: 187). 
Therefore, in contrast to the mainstream arguments, there is an incentive for Japan to 
preserve the pool of cheaper labour in East Asia, facilitate FDI and regionalised 
production networks and supply chains for goods destined for developed countries’ 
markets, while innovating to enhance productivity only to the extent that Japan’s 
competitive position is not undermined (Hobday, 1995: 186).  
More recently, an influential series of articles (Dollar and Kraay, 2000, 2003) 
from the World Bank featured empirical studies which, having undertaken a cross-
country analysis of 92 countries reaffirm the orthodox wisdom that trade liberalisation 
leads to higher growth in average incomes, which, on average, tends to benefit the poor 
as well as the non-poor. The logical flow of the argument used in support of neoliberal 
policy recommendations arising from the findings of the study can be condensed as 
follows: (1) On average across countries and time periods, growth is distribution-
neutral; therefore (2) any growth-enhancing policy is good for the poor; (3) since 
neoliberal economic policies increase the growth rate, it is rational to have these policies 
as the core of poverty-reduction strategies (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Despite bearing 
strong resemblance to the old “trickle-down” view of development (Kakwani, Khandki 
and Son, 2004), this policy recommendation has since been widely accepted and 
adopted by international organisations and major donor countries in their advice to 
developing countries, countervailing the emerging calls for “tailored, handmade and 
country-specific remedies” (Taylor, 2008: 544). However, some critics have pointed out 
that what is true on average does not necessarily hold true for the constituents of the 
average. Thus, this “sweeping neoliberal policy conclusion” does not provide a robust 
and credible basis for country-specific policies (Lübker, Smith and Weeks, 2002: 556; 
Nye, Reddy and Watkins, 2002). Notwithstanding these critiques it is important to 
clarify that the issue is not as clear-cut as free trade vs. protectionism. It is clear that the 
process of liberalisation produces both winners and losers. Therefore, the question that 
needs to be addressed is determining the policies which are actually able to promote 
pro-poor growth in a specific geographical, socio-political and historical context and it 
is the task of this thesis to examine whether or not the Aid-for-trade initiative is capable 
of achieving this aim, or whether it is merely a vehicle for the reaffirmation of the trade 
liberalisation agenda with one-size-fits-all recommendations. 
2.3 What Policy? Aid-for-Trade: Trade-Related ODA 
 
The conflicting interpretations and findings regarding the relationship between trade and 
economic growth were overshadowed by the lack of progress in the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations in the mid-to-late 1990s, marked by tensions regarding the issue of 
expanding WTO disciplines beyond the themes of lowering trade barriers and extending 
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the trade regime (Lester, 2007: 332). Following the disagreements and protests at the 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, the Round was recast as the “Doha 
Development Agenda”, making “development” the nominal focus of negotiations 
(Altman, 2007). Thus, the agenda has been reframed to put more emphasis on 
addressing supply-side constraints through technical cooperation and capacity building 
assistance in the form of concessionary aid (IMF, 2007; OECD and WTO, 2010: 21; 
ADB and WTO, 2011: 1). This is consistent with the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
adopted in November 2001 that emphasised the need to improve the integration of 
developing countries into the multilateral trading system and the global economy 
(WTO, 2001). In addition to prioritising the need for “mainstreaming trade in regional 
and national development strategies” (Sharma and Morrison, FAO, 2011: 38; ADB and 
WTO, 2011: 21) and reiterating the role of FDI and ODA as factors important to 
economic growth (ADB and WTO, 2011: 6), emphasis has been placed on linking trade 
to “sustainable human development” (ADB and WTO, 2011: 36; OECD, 2001: 7).  
The reformulation of the trade liberalisation and development agenda should be 
seen in light of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) which emphasised 
the need for an “open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory 
multilateral trading and financial system” for meeting the objectives on development 
and poverty eradication, and expressed concern “about the obstacles developing 
countries face in mobilising the resources needed to finance their sustained 
development”. The declaration also signified an undertaking to address the special 
needs of the less-developed countries (LDCs) including through duty- and quota-free 
access for essentially all their exports, and also to deal comprehensively and effectively 
with the debt problems of the low- and middle-income countries, encapsulated in the 
MDG 8, (UN, 2000).  Consequently, the Monterrey Consensus adopted at the 
International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 explicitly laid out a 
new framework of mutual obligations and accountability between developed and 
developing countries, building on the principles in the Millennium Declaration (Laird, 
UNCTAD, 2007). The report produced by the High-Level Panel on Financing for 
Development concluded that, even under the assumption that every developing country 
“sets its economic fundamentals in order” by “building effective domestic institutions 
and adopting sound policies”, it would require an extra US$50 billion per year of ODA 
to meet the MDGs (Zedillo et al., 2001). Therefore, the United Nations believed that 
development and poverty could be addressed through a combination of trade, financing 
for development and debt relief, welcoming the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 
November 2001 as contributing to MDG 8 (UN, 2003). 
Following on from the conclusion that a greater influx of financing for 
development is needed, the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Trade (2005) 
presented a set of goals to be attained by the ongoing Doha Round. The UN Task Force 
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reiterated the High-Level Panel’s recommendation in 2001 that ODA should be used to 
support countries “in generating the sources of revenue needed to compensate for losses 
incurred as a result of lowering import duties, in building the human and physical 
infrastructure they need to benefit from increased market opportunities, and in adjusting 
to erosions of existing trade preferences stemming from multilateral negotiations” (UN, 
2005: 11). Furthermore, the report argued that if trade is to contribute to economic 
growth and poverty reduction, it is necessary to achieve “policy coherence” at the 
national level, involving the adoption of “sound policies” by national governments in 
managing liberalisation, and at the international level, the report called for “a significant 
ramping up of ‘Aid-for-trade’ by the development community (to negotiate, assess, and 
implement WTO agreements…) and for a clear and realistic view of the WTO’s role in 
technical assistance” (UN, 2005: 9).  
Thus, broadly speaking, Aid-for-trade represents an attempt by the WTO, 
amongst other organisations, to help “foster trade-supportive environments” in order to 
assist developing countries to increase exports of goods and services, liberalise trade, 
increase the integration into the multilateral trading system and expand market access 
(WTO, 2011; ADB and WTO, 2011: 1). The underlying rationale for this initiative is 
that trade gives firms and households access to world markets for goods, services, and 
knowledge, generating investment and prompting higher productivity of domestic 
industries as a result of competition, exploitation of economies of scale and access to 
knowledge (ADB and WTO, 2011: 1). Thus, it is argued that in combination with 
complementary policies that relate to investment, infrastructure and human capital, trade 
can “boost the fight against poverty and foster more inclusive, sustainable 
development” (ADB and WTO, 2011: 1). In support of this argument, the ADB and 
WTO refer to the World Bank study Growth Is Good for the Poor (Dollar and Kraay, 
2000) (cf. Section 2.2). 
Having outlined the general argument behind the Aid-for-trade initiative and the 
link of its inception to MDGs and Financing for Development, it is necessary to 
examine the specifics. Despite a large amount of literature mentioning Aid-for-trade in 
recent years there is still confusion about what is covered and a lack of agreement about 
the way funds are to be disbursed. It is useful to outline the key objectives of the 
initiative, followed by the kinds of needs that it seeks to address before proceeding to an 
evaluation of whether external assistance of this kind should be used to address the 
needs concerned. There has been a recent attempt to clarify the key objectives of the 
initiative in a report produced by the WTO Committee on Trade and Development 
(WTO, 2011a). The first objective according to the report is achieving a greater 
coherence in trade and development policy, in particular related to issues such as 
“sustainable development, gender equality, food security, green growth and climate 
change” (WTO, 2011a: 3).  The primary focus of the initiative disclosed in the report is 
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the mobilisation of additional “predictable, sustainable and effective financing” which is 
challenging against the uncertainty of the global economic outlook (WTO, 2011a: 3). It 
is noted further that private sector activities are “fundamental to the effectiveness and 
sustainability of Aid-for-trade and to achieving poverty reduction objectives” and the 
report urges the expansion of both national and international private sector activities to 
participate in the implementation of the initiative (WTO, 2011a: 3).   
What is then the scope of Aid-for-trade and what are the needs it seeks to 
address? The report produced by the Aid-for-trade task force (WTO and OECD, 2006) 
sets out a number of somewhat vague categories with the justification that the “scope of 
Aid-for-trade should be defined in a way that is both broad enough to reflect the diverse 
trade needs identified by countries, and clear enough to establish a border between Aid-
for-trade and other development assistance of which it is a part” (2006: 1). The 
categories that have been identified in the report include the following (2006: 2): First, 
trade policy and regulations, including the training of trade officials, analysis of 
proposals and positions and their impact, support for national stakeholders to articulate 
commercial interest and identify trade-offs, dispute issues, institutional and technical 
support to facilitate implementation of trade agreements and to adapt to and comply 
with rules and standards; second, trade development, including investment promotion, 
analysis and institutional support for trade in services, business support services and 
institutions, public-private sector networking, e-commerce, trade finance, trade 
promotion, market analysis and development; third, trade-related infrastructure, 
including physical infrastructure; fourth, building productive capacity; and fifth,  
trade-related adjustment.  
In 2006, the World Bank (World Bank, 2006: 15) reconsidered the scope of Aid-
for-trade, suggesting that “an all-encompassing definition… would cover: trade policy 
and regulations; trade development activities; support to address ‘supply-side’ 
constraints (infrastructure); support for microeconomic adjustment (worker training, 
social safety nets, targeted subsidies); support for macroeconomic adjustment 
(preference erosion, fiscal revenue losses, impact of changes in food prices); and 
commodity price stabilisation”. According to the World Bank, Aid-for-trade can be 
delivered via technical assistance and capacity building, project financing, and policy 
lending, including support for adjustment to loss of fiscal revenue, preference erosion or 
institutional reform (World Bank, 2006: 15). However, the OECD, which has been the 
primary organiser of ODA notes that there is a substantial disagreement regarding the 
extent to which the scope of Aid-for-trade should cover capacity building (OECD, 
2006: 30). Moreover, the OECD expresses concern about the expansion of the Aid-for-
trade initiative, fearing that including such items as listed by the World Bank in the 
scope of the initiative in the context of the Doha Development Agenda could be 
interpreted as widening the scope of the WTO agenda and “raising unnecessary 
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concerns” about conditionality and links between domestic policy and trade reforms 
(OECD, 2006: 32).  
As a result, the OECD is adamant about excluding “macroeconomic and 
microeconomic adjustment” from the Aid-for-trade agenda (see Figure 2.1), which 
includes expenditure on social safety nets, balance of payments support and 
compensation for the potential costs of multilateral liberalisation, such as preference 
erosion or reduction in government revenue (OECD, 2006: 32).  Therefore, the OECD 
includes only concessional lending which is defined as loans that are extended on terms 
substantially more generous than market loans (OECD, 2011; IMF, 2003). Thus, the 
OECD view of the scope of Aid-for-trade subsumes ODA but excludes a large portion 
of trade-related lending by international financial institutions and regional development 
banks. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Scope of Aid-for-trade Agenda According to the OECD 
 
 
 
 
Most recently, a joint publication by the ADB and WTO (ADB and WTO, 2011) 
has seen a variation of the scope of Aid-for-trade. Primarily, the report suggests that in 
order to maximise effectiveness, projects falling under the scope of the Aid-for-trade 
agenda should focus on funding for developing infrastructure, strengthening economic 
corridors linking infrastructure design to production, promoting WTO accession, 
economic liberalisation and WTO-consistent policies and practices, promoting trade 
finance, upgrading competitiveness through export diversification, trade-related 
Source: OECD, 2006. 
24 
 
agriculture and services trade promotion, and building trade capacity (ADB and WTO, 
2011: 29-33). In addition to setting out the above categories of projects that should be 
targeted to optimise Aid-for-trade flows, ADB and WTO re-emphasise the role of ODA 
in attracting FDI, provided that the host country also implements structural reforms that 
comply with WTO requirements (2011: 28). 
2.3.1 Aid-for-Trade Snapshot  
 
It is difficult to differentiate the scope of Aid-for-trade from the general agenda of 
economic development. On the one hand, the requirements of “support to address 
‘supply side’ constraints” and “capacity building” could stretch to include general 
infrastructure expenditures, rather than being targeted specifically to trade-related 
infrastructure. On the other hand, it is not useful to isolate trade-related expenditure 
because spending on health, education, the environment, and infrastructure, would 
theoretically contribute towards export capacity-building. Thus, this poses significant 
difficulties in meeting the objective to develop indicators to monitor the impact of Aid-
for-trade given the limitations in tracing the flow of funds to isolate those results that 
are directly attributable to specific Aid-for-trade programmes or projects. In light of 
this, this study adopts the broader conceptualisation of trade-related ODA employed by 
the OECD rather than the more narrow focus of the WTO, which centres on WTO 
accession and providing assistance for training officials in complying with WTO rules.  
OECD data on Aid-for-trade statistics from 2002 to 2005 show total sector 
trade-related ODA commitments running at about US$25-30 billion a year which is 
around 30%of total ODA (OECD, 2012). In 2009, Aid-for-trade commitments reached 
USD 40 billion, up 60% compared to the 2002-05 baseline (OECD and WTO, 2011:48). 
Since the launch of the initiative a total US$137 billion has been committed with 44% 
going to building productive capacities, 53% to economic infrastructure
4
 and the 
remainder to trade policy regulations and trade-related adjustment (OECD and WTO, 
2011: 48). It is necessary to distinguish commitments and disbursements of funds. 
Commitments are forward-looking and show the amounts that donors will spend on 
certain development activities, while disbursements show actual financial payments 
and, thus, the realisation of donors’ intentions and the implementation of their policies 
(OECD and WTO, 2011: 48). Commitments are often multiyear, with subsequent 
disbursements spread over several years. On average, investment and infrastructure 
projects take the longest time to implement, lasting from five to eight years. 
Consequently, disbursements will almost always lag commitments. Even though 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix for the diversity of projects that are undertaken with these funds, especially in Vietnam 
and Thailand. 
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disbursement rates are high, commitments may not necessarily result in disbursements 
(OECD and WTO, 2009: 54).  
In addition, even though ODA is assigned to be a key source of Aid-for-trade 
flows, foreign direct investment and other private flows are constructed as “international 
resources for development” (UN, 2002: 9). Trade is presented as a private-sector-driven 
commercial activity and ODA is welcomed so long as it helps create a suitable 
regulatory environment because “…a positive business climate can attract FDI, which, 
if managed properly, builds both production and export capacity, thus igniting a 
virtuous cycle” (ADB and WTO, 2011: xiv). However, little support is provided to 
show that private sector commercial activity will be undertaken in ways that benefit the 
host country. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, only aggregates of ODA and other 
concessionary lending and grant operations are able to be monitored through the OECD 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Thus, the significance placed on the role of private 
activity, which consists mostly of investment by transnational corporations and private 
banks and export credits given by industries, stands in contrast to the limited ability to 
track the flows of funds to specific Aid-for-trade projects. This makes it difficult to 
assess the quality of Aid-for-trade in meeting countries’ needs.  
2.3.2 Concluding Comments: Aid-for-Trade and International Institutional Politics 
 
The Doha Round of WTO negotiations started with keen interest on the side of donor 
countries, but with uneasiness on the part of developing countries (Suwa-Eisenmann 
and Verdier, 2007: 481). Many developing countries believed that the promised 
development goals and ideas might not be realised due to the lack of donor delivery and 
commitments during earlier negotiation rounds or aid initiatives. Key issues facing 
developing countries during negotiations had not been resolved, such as the ability of 
people in poorer countries to access generic medicines and the impact of agricultural 
subsidies in rich countries on farmers in poorer countries (Lester, 2007: 333). Thus the 
Aid-for-Trade initiative, with its promise of additional funds, can be interpreted as an 
attempt to compensate developing countries for a weak WTO negotiating round. 
Furthermore, the immensely broad definition of Aid-for-trade provided by the WTO 
task force suggests an attempt to retain relevance by the WTO by labelling as many 
categories of ODA as “trade-related” to ensure that they fall within its scope. However, 
even though Aid-for-trade is “about helping developing countries”, the WTO “is not a 
development agency” (WTO, 2012: para.1, 4). Ultimately, while there is little doubt that 
good infrastructure and efficient productive capacity have a significant bearing on trade 
capacity, the theoretical and empirical literature shows that the relationship between 
trade and development is far from unequivocal.  
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3. Empirical Study Assessing the Effect of Aid-for-Trade on Growth 
and Exports 
 
Based on the reading of the theoretical, policy and empirical literature, this paper seeks 
to undertake cross-country analysis as well as country-specific analysis in order to test 
the empirical basis for the Aid-for-trade initiative for the Southeast Asian region in 
particular. In undertaking the empirical study, this paper makes an original contribution 
by analysing an existing dataset using a different empirical methodology, as explained 
below.  
3.1 Cross-Country Analysis for Growth 
 
Asia has been the largest recipient of Aid-for-trade flows, receiving 44%, followed by 
the 35% of flows to Africa (OECD and WTO, 2011). However, most empirical studies 
dealing with ODA, growth and trade concentrate on countries in the Sub-Saharan 
African region or conduct empirical studies of as many countries as possible over 
multiple decades in order to find a generalised result that holds across time and space. 
By focusing on a specific region – East Asia – it is possible to test the propositions 
about the beneficial effects of greater ODA and liberalised trade against key variables 
linked to growth, economic development and welfare. In addition, the likely effect of 
increased Aid-for-trade trade-related ODA is not yet known. The cross-country analysis 
conducted in this paper is not only part of testing the theory but also a step in assessing 
the potential impact of trade-related ODA in light of the current trends. The cross-
country analysis was conducted for two regions, Far East Asia and South and Central 
Asia, based on data from the Penn World Tables and the OECD Creditor Reporting 
System database. Both data sources have been used because the OECD does not 
currently conceptualise “East Asia” as a separate methodological category. The 
countries referred to in the ADB and WTO (2011) report on Aid-for-trade have been 
taken from both these categories so it would be arbitrary to focus on Far East Asia or 
South and Central Asia exclusively. Cross-country analysis was conducted for both 
trade-related ODA (Aid-for-trade) and ODA flows more generally, which is broader 
than trade-related activities (see Appendix).  
3.1.1 Methodology 
 
There are a number of competing methodologies that can be utilised to empirically 
evaluate the Aid-for-trade initiative, including its effect on key variables linked to 
development and welfare in developing nations. The first is to employ complex 
econometric models with simultaneous equations such as a vector autoregression 
(VAR) or a structural vector autoregression (SVAR), as is done in some mainstream 
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economic literature (Wooldridge, 2009). Such a course would be unwise in the current 
study because the available data does not suit these methodologies given the relatively 
short timeframe since Aid-for-trade was introduced. These time-series techniques rely 
on a sufficiently long data series to allow valid and convincing inferences to be made. 
For example, the use of Dickey-Fuller tests to detect a unit root, crucial for determining 
whether any obtained relationship is spurious, needs a time period of more than seven 
years. Moreover, these econometric methodologies tend to give results which cannot be 
easily interpreted and so will not assist in answering whether Aid-for-trade has had its 
intended impact.  
Two alternative techniques include relying on graphical analysis with summary 
statistics and panel data methods. Graphical analysis and summary statistics provide the 
advantages of a simple but clear way of presenting certain key relationships. They, 
therefore, facilitate a more direct interpretation of the results. The methodology still 
enables the controlling for countervailing or conflicting factors, adding plausibility to 
the interpretations given. Furthermore, the data includes observations for the same 
countries for multiple variables over time, enabling the use of panel data methods of 
analysis. Thus the obtained results can be interpreted without the need for simulations 
and mathematical transformations. Thus, this thesis will employ graphical 
analysis/summary statistics to obtain preliminary results. To check the robustness of the 
findings, the panel data methods will be employed in the second part of the analysis.  
3.1.2 Data 
 
The first data set was obtained from the ADB, the World Bank and Penn World Tables 
statistics databases and includes information on annualised growth rates, trade flows, 
gross national income (GNI), income inequality (Gini Index) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and bilateral aid flows for all the countries listed in Table 1. 
Annualised Aid-for trade data, including a breakdown across countries and economic 
sectors, was obtained from the OECD database. Further annual ODA statistics for these 
countries were obtained from the OECD database to enable checking the robustness of 
the obtained results. Finally, measures of total factor productivity growth for a subset of 
the countries under analysis were obtained from the national statistical agencies and 
central banks for each country.     
3.1.3 Summary Statistics Results 
 
The first step of the analysis involved calculating any correlations between the level of 
aid provided to a country and the country’s growth rate, level of FDI, GDP per capita, 
GNI per capita, the level of income inequality and productivity where data was 
available (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 
Relationships between Aid and Other Variables 
Country ρgrowth ρFDI 
ρGDP per 
Capita 
ρGNI per 
Capita 
ρGINI  ρProductivity ρExport 
Afghanistan -0.05 - - - - - 0.58 
Armenia -0.92 0.75 0.60 0.58 -0.77 - -0.04 
Azerbaijan 0.02 -0.52 0.90 0.86 - - 0.79 
Bangladesh 0.18 0.77 0.79 0.79 - - 0.85 
Bhutan -0.07 - 0.79 - - - 0.71 
Brunei Darussalam - - - - - - - 
Cambodia -0.61 0.82 0.93 0.93 -0.27 - 0.96 
China 0.15 0.71 0.73 0.73 - 0.21 0.78 
Georgia -0.78 0.24 0.82 - 0.41 - 0.79 
Hong Kong SAR, China - - - - - - - 
India -0.20 0.74 0.95 0.95 - - 0.93 
Indonesia 0.34 0.60 0.95 0.96 - -0.19 0.95 
Kazakhstan -0.93 0.73 0.60 0.52 -0.70 - 0.73 
Korea, Dem. Rep. - - - - - - 0.80 
Korea, Rep. - - - - - - - 
Kyrgyz Republic -0.34 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.10 - 0.91 
Lao PDR 0.75 0.82 0.96 0.93 - - 0.98 
Macao SAR, China - - - - - - - 
Malaysia -0.31 -0.66 0.74 0.80 0.97 0.05 0.69 
Maldives -0.08 0.78 0.59 - - - 0.02 
Mongolia -0.54 0.86 0.78 - - -0.22 0.79 
Nepal 0.41 0.91 0.94 - - - 0.23 
Pakistan -0.31 0.26 0.87 0.89 -0.51 - 0.71 
Philippines -0.04 0.00 0.95 0.95 -1.00 0.22 0.68 
Singapore - - - - - - - 
Sri Lanka 0.10 0.65 0.96 0.96 - - 0.84 
Tajikistan -0.81 -0.24 0.87 0.87 -0.68 - 0.33 
Thailand 0.40 0.45 -0.49 -0.52 0.99 0.31 -0.55 
Timor-Leste 0.53 - 0.55 - - - - 
Turkmenistan -0.46 - 0.89 0.40 - - 0.71 
Uzbekistan 0.43 - 0.74 0.26 - - 0.72 
Vietnam -0.63 0.87 0.97 0.96 -0.77 -0.35 0.94 
Data source: Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Penn World Tables and OECD; author’s 
calculations. 
 
 
The results in Table 3.1 suggest that the alleged relationship between Aid-for-
trade and positive development and welfare improvements is far from certain. The 
orthodox theoretical framework detailed in Chapter 2 suggests that Aid-for-trade is 
meant to achieve improved technological, export and output growth. For technology, 
the obtained correlations contradict this framework. For three of the seven countries 
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where data was available, there was a negative correlation between Aid-for-trade and 
total factor productivity and in the remaining countries the relationship is positive but 
weak. In terms of growth, higher levels of aid are correlated with lower levels of growth 
for most of the countries listed. Only ten out of the twenty three countries had a positive 
relationship between aid and growth and of these only in Laos was the relationship 
strong.
5
 The same unstable and contradictory relationship between the target variables 
and the instrument variable (AID) across countries is repeated within a country further 
subtracting from the case for the neoclassical theory. In Vietnam, higher aid is 
correlated with lower growth but higher exports and GDP per capita whilst in Thailand 
it is associated with lower exports but higher growth and FDI.  
However, for all but two countries, Aid-for-trade was correlated with higher 
levels of exports, providing some support for the traditional framework. While a strong 
relationship was found for most countries, interestingly, quite a strong, negative 
relationship was found for Thailand where Aid-for-trade flows have been concentrated. 
Evidence for a positive relationship between Aid-for-trade flows and FDI, GDP per 
capita and GNI per capita respectively was also found for the vast majority of countries 
with most countries exhibiting quite a strong relationship. On the whole, the obtained 
correlations provide initial evidence that the aid-export link of the orthodox framework 
exists. However, they also cast doubt on the link between aid and growth. Further 
investigation is needed to confirm these contentions. 
3.1.4 Panel Data Method and Results 
 
These correlations do not take into account any conflating factors and so a more 
extended analysis for all the nations is required to ascertain the robustness of the results. 
Under this methodology, it is postulated that output for each nation every time period is 
determined as follows: 
 
     
                        
 
where     is the natural logarithm of the level of output,     is a matrix containing the 
variety of control factors set out below (Table 3.2) and       is the amount of aid 
money given to country i in time t.    is a dummy variable taking the value of one for 
time t and zero otherwise and is designed to capture unobserved factors which change 
over time, such as global macroeconomic conditions, but not factors between countries. 
   represents those unobserved and unique factors which affect a countries output level, 
such as the level of entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
5
 According to most mainstream econometric textbooks, a correlation of 0-0.4 represents a weak 
relationship, 0.4-0.74 represents a moderately strong relationship and greater than 0.75 represents a strong 
relationship (Wooldridge, 2009). 
(1) 
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In order to avoid bias in the estimated co-efficients, it is necessary to eliminate 
the effect of unobserved variables by first differencing each variable between adjacent 
time periods. This yields the first-differenced or output growth version of (1): 
      
               ∑  
      
 
   
     
Observations over seven years are present. In order to accommodate this, the data for 
each first-differenced time period for 2003 to 2010 was pooled and then the ordinary 
least squares method was utilised to estimate the co-efficients. The pooling necessitated 
the inclusion of year dummies to capture any annual changes in the independent 
variable, explaining the precise form of the estimated equation.  
After applying the panel data methodology discussed above, the following 
results were obtained.  As highlighted in Table 3.2, Aid-for-trade has a negative effect 
on GDP growth, ceteris paribus, in all the specifications considered above. However, 
the estimated effects are not statistically significant at most conventional levels of 
significance and are also not economically significant. A one million current U.S. dollar 
increase in aid will only cause a 0.0008% decline in the growth rate of a country on 
average keeping everything else constant. Importantly though, the estimated co-efficient 
contradicts the theoretical argument postulated by the World Bank in the Asian region.  
A remaining issue is that the estimated co-efficient may be inconsistent and biased if 
variables which affect growth and are correlated with any of the independent variables 
chosen are omitted. One candidate is FDI. Moreover, it might be that the obtained 
results are still being affected by outliers in the sample. Table 3.3 presents the same 
estimated equations as those above (models (1) to (6)) to assess the robustness of the 
estimates when using a differently composed sample of countries and including FDI.  
The table demonstrates that the obtained co-efficients are not overly sensitive to omitted 
variables with nearly all of the co-efficients remaining the same sign and of a similar 
magnitude. The veracity of the obtained results is further demonstrated by exports, 
capital and the time variables for the GFC all having a plausible sign and magnitude 
when considering the nature of the countries under examination. While the estimated 
Aid for Trade co-efficient becomes positive once exports and FDI are included, this 
does not provide strong support to the traditional position because the co-efficient 
remains economically and statistically insignificant. 
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Table 3.2 
Growth Equation – Aid-for-Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 7.4317*** 
(0.4171) 
8.2913*** 
(0.5893) 
7.2061*** 
(0.4588) 
8.2243*** 
(0.6258) 
8.6522*** 
(1.1495) 
7.5861*** 
(0.6780) 
       
Aid -0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0009 
(0.0009) 
-0.0006 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0008) 
-0.0003 
(0.0008) 
       
Capital 
(rescaled) 
  0.0090*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0134*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0038) 
       
Labour 
(rescaled) 
  0.0858 
(0.1225) 
-0.0932 
(0.1455) 
 -0.0936 
(0.1202) 
       
Interest    -0.8982 
(0.5838) 
-0.8930 
(0.5950) 
-0.1336 
(0.8204) 
       
Export 
 
     0.0198** 
(0.0089) 
       
Pop. Growth 
 
    -0.4005 
(0.7378) 
 
       
D2005  0.4187 
(1.2123) 
 0.3093 
(1.2420) 
0.3178 
(1.2263) 
0.2281 
(1.0828) 
       
D2006  0.7286 
(1.4108) 
 0.6514 
(1.4133) 
0.6947 
(1.4100) 
0.0678 
(1.1468) 
       
D2007  1.4543 
(1.1411) 
 1.2534 
(1.1691) 
1.3113 
(1.1417) 
0.4825 
(0.8919) 
       
D2008  -1.7062** 
(0.8518) 
 -1.8697** 
(0.8868) 
-1.7762** 
(0.8470) 
-2.7715*** 
(0.9574) 
       
D2009  -5.0459*** 
(1.2744) 
 -5.1433*** 
(1.2080) 
-5.0432*** 
(1.2535) 
-2.8278** 
(1.3733) 
       
D2010  -1.8481** 
(0.7823) 
 -2.1846*** 
(0.7866) 
-2.0913*** 
(0.7548) 
-3.3177*** 
(0.9825) 
       
Sample Size 
R
2
 
161 
0.0014 
161 
0.1826 
161 
0.0258 
161 
0.2181 
161 
0.2192 
161 
0.3439 
       
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Countries included in this analysis: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, 
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
  
32 
 
Table 3.3 
Extended Growth Equation – Aid-for-Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Constant 7.0639*** 
(0.4600) 
7.8262*** 
(0.4804) 
6.7525*** 
(0.5128) 
7.6910*** 
(0.5184) 
8.5269*** 
(1.1212) 
7.0292*** 
(0.5617) 
7.0085*** 
(0.5778) 
        
Aid -0.0003 
(0.0009) 
-0.0003 
(0.0009) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
-0.0001 
(0.0009) 
-0.0001 
(0.0008) 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
        
Capital 
(rescaled) 
  
0.0094*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0142*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0119*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0133*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0037) 
        
Labour 
(rescaled) 
  
0.1407 
(0.1192) 
-0.0571 
(0.1438) 
 
-0.0655 
(0.1179) 
-0.0454 
(0.1145) 
        
Interest 
   
-0.6911 
(0.7413) 
-0.7658 
(0.7383) 
-0.2530 
(0.9059) 
-0.2058 
(0.9385) 
        
Export 
 
     
0.0207** 
(0.0102) 
0.0208** 
(0.0104) 
        
FDI 
      
-0.0154 
(0.0247) 
        
Pop. 
Growth 
 
    
-0.7445 
(0.8125) 
  
        
D2005 
 
0.7096 
(1.2912) 
 
0.6525 
(1.3160) 
0.6769 
(1.2850) 
0.5077 
(1.0982) 
0.5496 
(1.1165) 
        
D2006 
 
1.2442 
(1.5490) 
 
1.1727 
(1.5470) 
1.2287 
(1.5416) 
0.6449 
(1.2069) 
0.6487 
(1.2102) 
        
D2007 
 
1.3495 
(1.1493) 
 
1.1408 
(1.1650) 
1.1711 
(1.1093) 
0.4817 
(0.8110) 
0.5159 
(0.8092) 
        
D2008 
 
-1.7471** 
(0.7257) 
 
-
2.0085*** 
(0.7516) 
-
1.9302*** 
(0.7166) 
-
3.0199*** 
(0.9173) 
-
3.0133*** 
(0.9180) 
        
D2009 
 
-
5.1859*** 
(1.3430) 
 
-
5.2829*** 
(1.2516) 
-
5.1356*** 
(1.3430) 
-2.8219** 
(1.3963) 
-2.8623** 
(1.3962) 
        
D2010 
 
-1.7273** 
(0.7423) 
 
-
2.0825*** 
(0.7221) 
-
1.9913*** 
(0.6868) 
-
3.4113*** 
(0.9878) 
-
3.3646*** 
(0.9629) 
        
Sample 
Size 
R
2
 
140 
0.0002 
140 
0.1942 
140 
0.0349 
140 
0.2379 
140 
0.2432 
140 
0.3729 
140 
0.3736 
        
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Countries included in this analysis: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Georgia, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from these overall estimations. First, it 
would seem that the obtained average effect does contradict the key Aid-growth 
relationship in the orthodox theoretical framework but this conclusion is not robust to 
model specification or sample selection biases. Second, the contradictory findings set 
out above based on the correlations for each country (Section 3.1.3) are repeated in the 
cross-country analysis. Thus, the evidence suggests that Aid-for-trade can improve 
growth and other development indicators in some countries but not all. As a result, it is 
necessary to analyse whether the theory is true for a subset of countries to enable firmer 
conclusions to be made about the policy. 
The subset of countries that was chosen for the purpose of country-specific 
analysis is Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The choice was motivated 
by these countries being geographically close to control for access to trade routes, 
notwithstanding differences in their colonial histories and international orientations. 
This enables a more effective comparison of the application of Aid-for-trade across 
countries in the region. More importantly, these countries have the richest and most 
reliable source of data, enabling a more convincing analysis to be undertaken. 
Moreover, South East Asia was the most profiled sub-region in the case stories 
demonstrating the operation of the Aid-for-trade initiative on the ground (WTO, 
UNESCAP and OECD, 2011). In addition, this paper offers original analysis of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to counter the abundance of studies 
that focus exclusively on evaluating the effect of Aid-for-trade in African countries. 
3.2 Country-Specific Analysis for Growth and Exports 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of Aid-for-trade on achieving its primary goals - 
increased growth in targeted sectors and exports - the following analysis will be 
conducted for each chosen country. First, the size and direction of the Aid-for trade 
flows will be examined to identify the top ten sectors that should have experienced the 
greatest amount of growth and development. Second, the actual growth profile of the 
different sectors benefitting from Aid-for-trade will be analysed to ascertain whether or 
not the intended benefits have been realised. An attempt will be made at explaining any 
discrepancies in the effects of Aid-for-trade found during this comparison, with a view 
to determining whether or not the initiative has achieved its aims in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.2.1 Malaysia 
 
Turning first to consider the direction of Aid-for-trade, it is clear that the vast majority 
has been directed to improving the power generating capacity of Malaysia (Table 3.4). 
The pattern is repeated in the last available year with similar proportions being obtained 
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for each category, suggesting that the priorities for Aid-for-trade have not changed over 
the past decade (Table 3.5).  
 
Table 3.4 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Malaysia) 
2002-2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount ($USm) 
 
Proportion of Total  
 
Power Generation/non-renewable sources 451.06 27.29% 
Formal sector financial intermediaries 45.14 2.73% 
Nuclear power plants 27.82 1.68% 
Fishery development 14.42 0.87% 
Industrial policy and administrative management 12.12 0.73% 
Engineering 11.84 0.72% 
Forestry policy and administrative management 8.71 0.53% 
Financial policy and administrative management 5.12 0.31% 
Business support services and institutions 4.45 0.27% 
Trade facilitation 4.08 0.25% 
Total to top ten sectors 584.76 35.38% 
Total to all sectors 1652.93 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Malaysia) 
2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount ($USm) 
 
Proportion of Total 
 
Power generation/non-renewable sources 25.38 13.05% 
Nuclear power plants 14.68 7.55% 
Engineering 2.98 1.53% 
Trade facilitation 1.04 0.53% 
Forestry policy and administrative management 0.96 0.49% 
Business support services and institutions 0.92 0.47% 
Formal sector financial intermediaries 0.84 0.43% 
Fishery development 0.46 0.24% 
Water transport 0.45 0.23% 
Biomass 0.44 0.23% 
Total to top ten sectors 48.15 24.75% 
Total to all sectors 194.51 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
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As a result, in order to assess the effectiveness of Aid-for-trade, it is necessary to 
examine whether or not the power generation sector and the financial system have been 
positively affected. A comparison of the growth rates of the finance and electricity, gas 
and water sectors of the economy will allow such a positive effect to be identified. As 
Figure 3.1 illustrates, while there might be a positive relationship for the electricity, gas 
and water sectors, it certainly does not appear to be strong as reflected by the correlation 
of only 0.58 for the 2002-2010 period. Indeed, there is also a moderate relationship (ρ = 
0.50) between the growth rates of Aid-for-trade to electricity, gas and water sector and 
economic activity in the sector between 2003-2010 which could support the contention 
that the financial influx of aid has had little effect on improving the sector. For example, 
aid decreased by -90.98% between 2003-2004 but growth in the electricity, gas and 
water sector only increased by 2.21% (4.45% to 6.66%) and likewise aid increased 
between 2006-2007 by 338.79%  but growth only increased by 0.03% (4.63% to 
4.66%). 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Department of Statistics (Malaysia) (2012). 
 
 
A contradictory conclusion is found in the transport/communication sector 
where a weak, negative correlation was found (ρ = -0.26), and between 2003-2004 
during a period of increasing world, growth aid decreased by 38.60% but the growth 
rate of activity actually rose 3.93% from 4.29% to 8.22% (Figure 3.2). For Aid-for-trade 
directed to trade education/training, trade facilitation and trade policy and 
administrative management there is a very weak, positive relationship (ρ = 0.01). In the 
finance sector, there is a positive relationship between aid and sector activity (ρ = 0.41) 
as well as changes in growth (ρ = 0.67).  
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Figure 3.1 
Comparison of Aid and Output for Electricity, Gas and Water Sector 
(Malaysia) 
Aid to Sector Activity in Sector
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Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Department of Statistics (Malaysia) (2012). 
 
Ultimately it would seem that the mixed result obtained for the cross-country 
analysis is also obtained for Malaysia. These results for Malaysia once again challenge 
the link between Aid-for-trade and growth as contended by the orthodox theoretical 
framework that formed the basis for the Aid-for-trade initiative. The case study of 
Malaysia therefore further undermines the prediction that Aid-for-trade must have an 
unambiguously positive effect on its target variables.  
3.2.2 Philippines 
 
A large proportion of Aid-for-trade to the Philippines was directed to improving various 
parts of the transport sector, with a secondary focus on power generation between 2002-
2010 (Table 3.6). In recent times, this trend was repeated with an increasing focus on 
transport and policy and administrative management (Table 3.7).  
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Figure 3.2 
Comparison of Aid and Output for Transport/Communication Sector 
(Malaysia) 
Aid to Sector Activity in Sector
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Table 3.6 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Philippines) 
2002-2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount ($USm) 
 
Proportion of Total 
 
Road transport 1028.49 16.68% 
Water transport 241.22 3.91% 
Air transport 236.25 3.83% 
Rail transport 216.45 3.51% 
Transport policy and administrative management 178.19 2.89% 
Agricultural water resources 130.52 2.12% 
Formal sector financial intermediaries 120.80 1.96% 
Business support services and institutions 113.53 1.84% 
Agricultural land resources 86.38 1.40% 
Hydro-electric power plants 82.76 1.34% 
Total to top ten sectors 2434.59           39.48% 
Total to all sectors 6164.75 
 Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
 
Table 3.7 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Philippines) 
2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount ($USm) 
 
Proportion of Total 
 
Road transport 129.39 12.07% 
Transport policy and administrative management 42.75 3.99% 
Agricultural financial services 39.05 3.64% 
Agricultural development 25.53 2.38% 
Formal sector financial intermediaries 15.18 1.42% 
Hydro-electric power plants 14.24 1.33% 
Agricultural water resources 11.42 1.07% 
Business support services and institutions 11.21 1.05% 
Agrarian reform 9.00 0.84% 
Nuclear power plants 7.69 0.72% 
Total to top ten sectors 305.46 28.51% 
Total to all sectors 1072.30 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
 
Turning to the performance of these various sectors, there are a number of 
interesting issues. First, for the transport/communication sector, there appears a positive 
and reasonably strong relationship between aid and economic activity (ρ = 0.67). 
However, Figure 3.3 demonstrates that aid does not have overly significant effects 
because the large fluctuations in aid are not replicated in large fluctuations in activity.  
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Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of 
Philippines) (2012). 
 
A similar result is obtained for the Electricity, Gas and Water sector (Figure 3.4) 
with a reasonably strong, positive relationship (ρ = 0.58) including for the growth rates 
of aid against economic activity growth. This is corroborated by the estimates for the 
finance and trade sectors (ρ = 0.72 and ρ = 0.65 respectively). However, the significant 
increase and then decrease in aid between 2006-2009 without a corresponding decline in 
economic activity indicates that Aid-for-trade may not have the significant economic 
effects on improving economic performance as asserted by advocates of the policy.  
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of 
Philippines) (2012). 
 
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
400.0
450.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
A
ct
iv
it
y
 i
n
 S
ec
to
r 
($
U
S
m
) 
A
id
 t
o
 S
ec
to
r 
($
U
S
m
) 
Figure 3.3 
Comparison of Aid and Output for Transport/Communication Sector 
(Philippines) 
Aid to Sector Activity in Sector
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
A
ct
iv
it
y
 i
n
 S
ec
to
r 
($
U
S
m
) 
A
id
 t
o
 S
ec
to
r 
($
U
S
m
) 
Figure 3.4 
Comparison of Aid and Output for Electricity, Gas and Water Sector 
(Philippines) 
Aid to Sector Activity in Sector
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For agricultural exports and fishery exports, the overall evidence is that higher 
aid is associated with greater exports (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). As with previous analysis, 
forestry products saw aid have an opposite effect with a weak, negative relationship 
between aid and the level of forestry exports (ρ = -0.25). 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of 
Philippines) (2012). 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of 
Philippines) (2012). 
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Figure 3.5 
Comparison of Aid and Output for Agricultural Exports (Philippines) 
Aid to Sector Activity in Sector
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Figure 3.6 
Comparison of Aid and Output for Fishery Exports (Philippines) 
Aid to Sector Activity in Sector
40 
 
Thus, it would seem that the case for Aid-for-trade working as intended in terms 
of impact on the targeted sector per dollar is much stronger for the Philippines than for 
Malaysia. Importantly, this case study provides corroborating evidence at a 
disaggregated level that the Aid-for-trade and export link is present and reasonably 
strong for some countries. Again, however, there appears to be no consistently strong 
link between Aid-for-trade and all its objectives, particularly growth.  
3.2.3 Thailand 
 
As with the previous countries, Aid-for-trade was directed mostly towards air, rail and 
road transportation and electrical transmission/distribution over the 2002-2010 period 
(Table 3.8) with the pattern continuing in the latest available data (Table 3.9). 
 
Table 3.8 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Thailand) 
2002-2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount ($USm) 
 
Proportion of Total 
 
Air transport 1173.33 32.16% 
Rail transport 433.06 11.87% 
Road transport 163.23 4.47% 
Electrical transmission/ distribution 75.01 2.06% 
Formal sector financial intermediaries 52.15 1.43% 
Business support services and institutions 49.95 1.37% 
Industrial policy and administrative management 49.58 1.36% 
Agricultural research 41.04 1.12% 
Engineering 39.20 1.07% 
Technological research and development 30.44 0.83% 
Total to top ten sectors 2106.99 57.74% 
Total to all sectors 3648.90 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
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Table 3.9 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Thailand) 
2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount 
($USm) 
 
Proportion of 
Total 
 
Rail transport 141.26 38.18% 
Engineering 10.35 2.80% 
Air transport 8.71 2.35% 
Communications policy and administrative 
management 4.21 1.14% 
Agricultural development 4.10 1.11% 
Business support services and institutions 3.78 1.02% 
Industrial development 3.47 0.94% 
Nuclear power plants 2.75 0.74% 
Agricultural research 2.30 0.62% 
Industrial policy and administrative management 2.00 0.54% 
Total to top ten sectors 182.93 49.44% 
Total to all sectors 370.01 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
 
Turning to the actual sectors that would have benefitted from the flows, the 
results are quite mixed. For the transport sector, aid is associated with lower levels of 
activity (ρ = -0.38) but the opposite relationship is found for the finance, electricity, gas 
and water and trade sectors. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 highlight though that even in these 
sectors, large fluctuations in aid are not replicated in the level of economic activity 
which suggests that aid does not have large economic effects in these sectors. This 
contradicts the mainstream position that there is a strong, positive relationship between 
Aid-for-trade and growth in the targeted sectors.  
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Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012), Bank of Thailand (2012). 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bank of Thailand (2012). 
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Comparison  of Aid and Output for Transport/Communication Sector 
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Comparison of Aid and Output for Electricity, Gas and Water Sector 
(Thailand) 
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Focussing explicitly on export industries that received considerable amounts of 
aid, one cannot detect an unambiguous relationship between aid and the level of 
exports. For the forestry sector, there is a weak, positive relationship but, as Figures 3.9 
and 3.10 suggest, the opposite is true for the fishery and agricultural export industries (ρ 
= -0.23 and -0.04 respectively).  
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bank of Thailand (2012). 
 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bank of Thailand (2012). 
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Comparison of Aid and Output for Fishery Exports (Thailand) 
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Comparison of Aid and Output for Agricultural Exports (Thailand) 
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It is surprising that at such a disaggregated level, the relationship between 
exports and Aid-for-trade does not become more definite and this goes on to support the 
conclusion that the Aid-for-trade policy can fail to achieve its primary aims. These 
results for export sectors in Thailand contradict the results obtained for the Philippines, 
providing evidence that even at the level of individual sectors, there is no universally-
applicable link between Aid-for-trade and exports.  
3.2.4 Vietnam 
 
As Table 3.10 shows, the vast majority of Aid-for-trade over the 2002-2010 period was 
directed towards transportation, particularly road transportation as well as power 
generation. The greatest improvements in economic activity should therefore be 
observed in such sectors. 
 
Table 3.10 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Vietnam) 
2002-2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount 
($USm) 
 
Proportion of 
Total 
 
Road transport 2444.05 14.75% 
Electrical transmission/ distribution 818.09 4.94% 
Power generation/non-renewable sources 766.87 4.63% 
Water transport 386.58 2.33% 
Financial policy and administrative management 355.65 2.15% 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
development 
332.23 2.00% 
Formal sector financial intermediaries 307.56 1.86% 
Agricultural water resources 272.61 1.64% 
Hydro-electric power plants 237.73 1.43% 
Agricultural development 213.69 1.29% 
Total to top ten sectors 6135.06 37.02% 
Total to all sectors 16571.88 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
 
The pattern is repeated for 2010 which reaffirms the need to focus on the precise 
sectors identified to ascertain the effect of Aid-for-trade in Vietnam (Table 3.11).  
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Table 3.11 
Sectoral Direction of Aid-for-Trade (Vietnam) 
2010 
 
Sector 
 
Total Amount 
($USm) 
 
Proportion of 
Total 
 
Road transport 584.95 18.24% 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
development 
142.11 4.43% 
Electrical transmission/ distribution 137.52 4.29% 
Energy policy and administrative management 121.18 3.78% 
Power generation/non-renewable sources 120.90 3.77% 
Water transport 100.84 3.14% 
Agricultural water resources 100.30 3.13% 
Rail transport 47.94 1.50% 
Financial policy and administrative management 32.52 1.01% 
Transport policy and administrative management 31.03 0.97% 
Total to top ten sectors 1419.29 44.26% 
Total to all sectors 3206.29 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b). 
 
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 demonstrate that the relationship between Aid-for-trade 
and the economic activity in the targeted sector is not entirely consistent but is strong in 
the transport/communication (ρ = 0.95) and power generation sectors (ρ = 0.94). A 
positive but weaker relationship (ρ = 0.76) was found for the aid directed at trade 
facilitation, education and trade policy and management. While these represent the 
strongest relationships between Aid-for-trade and its objectives out of the countries 
examined, there were plenty of anomalies in each sector which demonstrates the 
unpredictable nature of the Aid-for-trade effect on individual sectors. For example, aid 
to the transport sector fell by 6.41% over 2005-2006 but economic activity in the sector 
rose by 10.13% compared to 9.61% over the 2004-2005 period. Likewise, during the 
2004-2005 period, aid to the electricity, gas and water sector fell by 23.84% but activity 
rose by 7.45% compared to 6.66%. Furthermore, the opposite effect of Aid-for-trade 
was found for the finance sector which has a weak negative relationship for the 2003-
2010 period (ρ = -0.41) and a negative relationship between the growth of aid and the 
growth of economic activity in the sector. 
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Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); General Statistics Office (Vietnam) (2012). 
 
 
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); General Statistics Office (Vietnam) (2012). 
 
Similar results were also obtained when focussing on export industries that 
benefitted from Aid-for-trade flows. A strong, positive relationship was found for the 
agricultural and forestry export sector (Figure 3.13; ρ = 0.86) and a positive relationship 
for the forestry export sector as well (Figure 3.14; ρ = 0.19). These results for the 
agricultural/forestry export, electricity, gas and water and transport/communications 
sectors provide the most convincing evidence of the link between Aid-for-trade and 
exports as well as with growth. 
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Data source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); General Statistics Office (Vietnam) (2012). 
 
 
Data source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); General Statistics Office (Vietnam) (2012). 
 
Despite Vietnam providing the strongest evidence at the sector level of the link 
between Aid-for-trade and exports, and being supportive of the orthodox framework, 
these results must be contrasted with those of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand to 
make a more complete and compelling assessment. Ultimately, the evidence is far from 
clear-cut and the key postulates of the orthodox framework used to justify the Aid-for-
trade initiative are challenged, especially in Malaysia and Thailand.  Even in Vietnam 
there are contradictions that further establish that the key relationships between Aid-for-
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trade and exports/growth do not universally hold as contended by the mainstream 
framework discussed earlier. It also appears from Table 3.12 that contrary to the World 
Bank’s postulate discussed in Section 2.2, Aid-for-trade has the largest effect6 in the 
country which is the least open using a standard measure of revealed openness, the trade 
(including imports and exports) to GDP ratio. Vietnam had an average trade to GDP 
ratio of 0.56 for the 2002-2010 period which was the lowest out of the four nations 
considered (Malaysia – 1.69, Thailand – 1.56 and Philippines – 0.75) but had the largest 
correlation co-efficients for the sectors under examination.  
 
Table 3.12  
Correlation Co-efficients Between Aid to Sector and Economic Activity in Sector 
 
Sector/Country  Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
     
Trade 0.01 0.65 0.18 0.76 
Transport -0.26 0.67 -0.38 0.95 
Finance 0.41 0.72 0.20 -0.41 
Electricity 0.58 0.58 0.47 0.94 
Average Revealed Openness Index
7 1.70 0.75 1.56 0.56 
     
Data source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); author’s calculations. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 While the correlation co-efficients are reported, there is a positive relationship between the estimated 
effect of aid on economic activity of the sector in a simple regression model and so for analytic purposes 
it is irrelevant which is reported (Wooldridge, 2009). 
7
 (Exports + Imports)/GDP, cf Section 2.1.3. 
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4. Factors Influencing the Efficacy of Aid-for-Trade on Growth and 
Exports 
 
There are a variety of potential reasons for the ambiguity of these results for both the 
cross-country and country-specific analyses. These could include factors discussed in 
Section 2.3.1, such as time lags in donor disbursement of the aid and time lags resulting 
from the application of the funds to particular projects. This is particularly true for 
trade-related aid for infrastructure because it takes time to build. However, this section 
focuses on the following discrepancies: variations of objectives for providing trade-
related ODA, including tied aid (4.1.1) and production networks (4.1.2); and variations 
in the composition of exports and GDP between countries (4.2). 
4.1 Variations in Objectives for the Provision of Aid-for-Trade 
4.1.1 Tied Aid 
 
Donor aid is often regarded as “tied aid”. This refers to the fact that aid increases donor-
recipient exports (Johansson and Pettersson, 2009; Clay, Geddes, and Natali, 2009). 
Even though formally “tied” aid is being slowly phased out through donors’ removal of 
legal and regulatory impediments to the procurement of goods and services outside the 
donor’s own market (Clay, Geddes, and Natali, 2009), this does not necessarily have a 
developmental or trade impact, unless it is accompanied by a change in actual practice. 
Attempting to overcome the weak historical and current data on tied aid as a result of 
non-reporting in previous years and incomplete information in the OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System database, the present thesis undertakes a comparison of top ODA 
donors and import partners of Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. This 
exercise is intended to examine the extent of informally tied aid by determining whether 
or not, regardless of poor reporting, there is an association between the ODA provided 
and the volume of exports from the donor country imported by the aid recipient.  
Table 4.1 shows the cross-over between the top 10 Aid-for-trade donors to 
Malaysia and its top import partners for the period of 2002-2010. It is clear that there 
are no developing nations who are a major import partner and also a major aid donor. 
However, a number of developed nations are both a major import partner and a large aid 
donor. In the overall examined period of 2002-2010 Japan provided an overwhelming 
86.81% of total disbursements. Alongside Japan, the other recurring donors who are 
also major import partners are the United States, Germany and Australia. This suggests 
a persistent relationship between trade-related ODA and donor exports to Malaysia. The 
size of this effect is often referred to as the “effective amount of tied aid” (Nilsson, 
1997; Wagner, 2003). An almost identical pattern is obtained for the Philippines (Table 
4.2), Thailand (Table 4.3) and Vietnam (Table 4.4) with the major import partners, 
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specifically Japan and the United States, consistently being the largest aid donors. For 
example, Japan gave 62.37%, 69.69% and 34.39% of the aid to the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam, respectively, for the period of 2002-2010. The donors 
contributed15.59%, 20.76%, and 19.39% of total imports respectively for the period.  
 
Table 4.1 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Import Partners (Malaysia) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 
Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10  
Imports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
  
  
   
Japan 2128.93 86.81% Japan 154074.20 13.96% 
Germany 75.62 3.08% United States 136771.30 12.40% 
United 
Kingdom 
52.08 2.12% 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
129925.10 11.78% 
United 
States 
50.67 2.07% 
Singapore 
126852.55 11.50% 
Denmark 41.94 1.71% Thailand 60409.22 5.48% 
France 33.83 1.38% Korea, Rep. of 56000.57 5.08% 
Australia 11.65 0.48% Indonesia 48225.96 4.37% 
Spain 8.74 0.36% Germany 47821.76 4.33% 
Norway 6.75 0.28% Hong Kong, China 29155.48 2.64% 
GEF 6.71 0.27% Australia 21441.02 1.94% 
Total 2452.28 96.49% Total Imports 1103304.40 73.48% 
            
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
 
Table 4.2 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Import Partners (Philippines) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 
Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Import 
Partners 
Imports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
  
  
   
Japan 6276.72 62.37% United States 67415.32 15.59% 
United 
States 
1066.50 10.60% 
Japan 
64096.78 14.82% 
Australia 535.38 5.32% Singapore 37909.55 8.77% 
Germany 
474.03 4.71% 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
29584.85 6.84% 
Spain 255.09 2.53% Korea, Rep. of 26803.25 6.20% 
France 237.13 2.36% Saudi Arabia 21280.53 4.92% 
EU 
Institutions  
210.15 2.09% 
Thailand 
19393.65 4.48% 
Global Fund  163.94 1.63% Malaysia 17604.22 4.07% 
Canada 129.27 1.28% Hong Kong, China 16252.93 3.76% 
Korea 124.23 1.23% Indonesia 11528.48 2.67% 
Total 10063.56 94.12% Total Imports 432498.40 72.12% 
            
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
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Table 4.3 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Import Partners (Thailand) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 
Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Import 
Partners 
Imports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
  
    
  
Japan 3619.32 69.69% Japan 233328.70 20.76% 
United 
States 
301.31 5.80% 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
122348.85 10.88% 
France 260.58 5.02% United States 79687.08 7.09% 
Global Fund  233.81 4.50% Malaysia 68346.32 6.08% 
Germany 
226.96 4.37% 
 United Arab 
Emirates 
53760.85 4.78% 
EU 
Institutions  
154.86 2.98% 
 Singapore 
47037.90 4.18% 
Australia 58.63 1.13% Korea, Rep. of 43944.44 3.91% 
Sweden 56.62 1.09% Saudi Arabia 35362.51 3.15% 
Denmark 55.31 1.06% Indonesia 31301.72 2.78% 
Netherlands 34.80 0.67% Australia 30839.03 2.74% 
Total 5193.52 96.31% Total Imports 1124161.80 62.17% 
            
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
 
Table 4.4 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Import Partners (Vietnam)  
2002-2010 
Top 10 Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Import 
Partners 
Imports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
      
Japan 6913.72 34.69% 
China, 
People's Rep. 
of 88326.90 19.39% 
International 
Development 
Association 
(IDA) 
5479.93 27.50% Japan 48728.98 10.70% 
France 1398.00 7.02% Singapore 45125.14 9.91% 
Germany 824.23 4.14% Korea, Rep. of 45100.24 9.90% 
United Kingdom 671.24 3.37%  Thailand 28270.68 6.21% 
Australia 548.36 2.75% Malaysia 16366.19 3.59% 
United States 458.95 2.30% United States 15708.81 3.45% 
Denmark 402.14 2.02% 
Hong Kong, 
China 11815.78 2.59% 
Netherlands 399.09 2.00%  Indonesia 9828.29 2.16% 
EU Institutions  314.25 1.58%  India 9699.73 2.13% 
Total  19928.28 87.37% Total Imports 455419.30 70.03% 
      
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
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There are a number of explanations for the trend of aid creating lasting links between 
the donor and recipient. One potential explanation is through importers keeping 
relationships with current suppliers, these countries are aware of the state of the 
recipient’s development situation, including the relatively poor state of, for instance, 
Malaysia’s infrastructure (Jensen and Kara, 2011: 2063). However, a more likely 
explanation is that the effectiveness of Aid-for-trade is undermined through either the 
formal or informal tying of aid by the top donors. This explanation is supported in the 
literature demonstrating that some types of Aid-for-trade are easier to informally tie 
than other forms of ODA (Johansson and Pettersson, 2009: 6). In particular this is true 
for the three Aid-for-trade categories: flows under the Trade-related technical assistance 
and capacity-building category, which involve the employment of donor country experts 
in giving advice on trade policy and regulation and trade development; flows under 
trade-related infrastructure which are associated with the importation of capital goods, 
means of production and technology from the donor; and flows categorised as “building 
productive capacity”, which entail obtaining specialised advice from donor consultants 
and experts on projects relating to banking and financial services, agriculture, forestry, 
fishery, industry, mining and tourism (WTO, UNESCAP and OECD, 2011).  
The donor-centric nature of Aid-for-trade is confirmed by an examination of 
reasons for the prevalence of three sectors (electrical transmission/distribution, energy 
policy and administrative management and power generation/non-renewable sources) in 
attracting Aid-for-trade funding across Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. 
According to the World Energy Outlook 2009 (IEA, 2009: 42) energy demand is 
expected to increase rapidly in the future mainly in countries that are not members of 
the OECD,
8
 and consequently energy security issues including the diversification of 
primary energy are expected to become more relevant considerations. Concurrently, 
summit-level meetings such as the G8 and G20 engage in discussion relating to the need 
to reduce greenhouse gas emission levels arising from the energy sector as identified in 
the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change held in Copenhagen in 2009. Therefore, efforts have been applied to 
making improvements to the conventional power generation technologies such as the 
thermal efficiency of boilers and turbines, as well as developing new energy 
technologies such as solar thermal power generation and to commercialising advanced 
power supply systems utilising IT technologies such as smart grids.  
Taking account of these trends, the Japanese government issued The New 
Growth Strategy: Blueprint for Revitalising Japan, in which it endorsed Japan as an 
“environment and energy power” and thus would actively promote Japan’s 
environmental energy technologies overseas in an effort to facilitate market expansion 
                                                 
8
 Over 80% of growth in demand for energy takes place in non-OECD countries (OECD and IEA, 
2009:42). 
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to counter its near 20-year stagnation following the collapse of the bubble economy of 
the 1990s (METI, 2010: 1-3). Therefore, consistent with Romer’s postulate that 
economic growth is fuelled by technological progress and the expansion of the market 
for intermediate or capital goods (cf. Section 2.1.2), JICA is actively involved in 
providing Aid-for-trade support to developing countries, recognising that there are 
many industry sectors in which the development of new technologies and the creation of 
new businesses are expected, such as the energy sector and transportation sector  
(METI, 2010: 3). 
While identifying tied aid as an explanation for the congruity between the sets of 
top aid donors and import partners, there are also a number of discrepancies for each of 
the nations that need to be examined. First, Singapore appears as one of the top import 
partners for Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam but is not featured in the top 
donors. The likely explanation for this discrepancy is that Singapore’s location near the 
Malacca Straits has made it the most important shipping hub and financial centre in 
Asia, alongside Hong Kong, which is one of the top import partners for the three 
countries (excluding Thailand). The Malacca Straits link the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific Ocean, thus linking major oil-producing countries from the Middle East with the 
major oil-consuming markets of the Far East. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia are part of the top import partners for the Philippines and Thailand but do 
not appear on the donor list. This can be explained by the high demand for energy by 
developing nations so that these countries have no need to protect or foster their  
export markets.  
The remaining countries on the top donor list but not on the major import 
partner list can be grouped into two categories: the first being former colonial powers 
(United Kingdom in Malaysia; Spain in the Philippines with later occupation by the 
United States and Japan; and France in Vietnam) (Alesina and Dollar, 2000: 33-34); and 
the second being Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the 
Netherlands). The remaining top import partners which do not give aid are other 
developing nations within ASEAN. The analysis of Aid-for-trade and import partners 
indicates that existing trading relationships along with the requisite commercial and 
foreign policy considerations are important in understanding the factors shaping the 
flow of aid. However, it is necessary to explore the export side of these relationships in 
order to gain a fuller understanding of the operation of Aid-for-trade.  
4.1.2 Production Networks and Supply Chains 
 
It has been noted that donors choose to support the development process for their 
trading partners rather than for other countries (Johansson and Petterson, 2009: 6). As 
with imports, economic considerations tend to provide the basis for providing aid in this 
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way. These considerations can be grouped into (1) improving the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of global supply chains for goods destined for developed countries’ 
markets or regional networks of production or (2) securing strategic interests and 
resources through aid which may entail either an explicit obligation to sell to the donor 
country or an implicit obligation to sell to the donor as a means of securing future aid 
flows. Production networks involve cross-border dispersion of component production 
and assembly, where each country specialises in a particular stage of the process 
(Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; cf. Section 2.2), thus increasing the necessity of 
importing intermediate inputs from partner countries to produce outputs.  
The purpose of the following section is to verify whether or not this trend still 
exists through a comparison of the aid and export flows for Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam as set out in the following tables (Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8), or 
whether trade-related aid has contributed to mitigating the heavy dependence on non-
Southeast Asian demand for exports that was manifest throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
A closer consideration of this issue will be undertaken in the next section through the 
examination of the composition of exports of Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to map out the global and 
regional production networks,
9
 future research on such effects for specific economic 
sectors would be desirable in order to assess whether or not Aid-for-trade projects have 
affected the extent of product upgrading in components traded.  
As the tables set out below demonstrate, the vast majority of trade-related ODA 
received by the analysed countries originates in their major export markets such as 
Japan and the United States. Vietnam (Table 4.5) represents the most striking case with 
six out of the top ten aid donors for the 2002-2010 period being major export partners. 
The result is that the major export partners of Vietnam provide an overwhelming 
proportion of the aid (49.25%). The overlap between export partners and aid donors is 
also seen in Malaysia (Table 4.6) where Japan, the United States and Australia, 
representing 9.96%, 15.45%, and 3.29% of total imports respectively between 2002-
2010, are also amongst the largest aid donors (86.81%, 2.07%, and 0.48% respectively). 
A very similar pattern is established for the Philippines (Table 4.7) with Japan and the 
United States being both the two largest export markets and aid donors (for aid: 62.37% 
and 10.60% and for exports: 18.07% and 16.20% respectively). For Thailand (Table 
4.8), Japan, the United States and Australia comprise the overlap between major export 
markets and aid donors.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 For research that has been done in this area, see Devadason, E. (2009), Malaysia-China network trade: A 
note on product upgrading, Journal of Contemporary Asia 39(1), pp.36-49. 
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Table 4.5 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Export Partners (Vietnam) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Export 
Partners 
Exports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
      
Japan 6913.72 34.69% United States 72770.5 19.46% 
International 
Development 
Association 
(IDA) 
5479.93 27.50% Japan 47045.36 12.58% 
France 1398.00 7.02% China 33485.4 8.96% 
Germany 824.23 4.14% Australia 24235.9 6.48% 
United Kingdom 671.24 3.37% Singapore 16345.61 4.37% 
Australia 548.36 2.75% Germany 13365.64 3.57% 
United States 458.95 2.30% Korea, Rep. of 11269.03 3.01% 
Denmark 402.14 2.02% Malaysia 11068.32 2.96% 
Netherlands 399.09 2.00% 
United 
Kingdom 
10555.58 2.82% 
EU Institutions  314.25 1.58% Netherlands 8778.31 2.35% 
Total  19928.28 87.37% Total Exports 373876.2 66.56% 
      
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
 
Table 4.6 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Export Partners (Malaysia) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 
Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Export 
Partners 
Exports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
  
  
   
Japan 2128.93 86.81% United States 209853.00 15.45% 
Germany 75.62 3.08% Singapore 201946.80 14.87% 
United 
Kingdom 
52.08 2.12% 
Japan 
135335.90 9.96% 
United 
States 
50.67 2.07% 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
120244.31 8.85% 
Denmark 41.94 1.71% Hong Kong, China 70921.70 5.22% 
France 33.83 1.38% Thailand 68109.93 5.01% 
Australia 11.65 0.48% Korea, Rep. of 48961.16 3.60% 
Spain 8.74 0.36% Netherlands 46963.89 3.46% 
Norway 6.75 0.28% Australia 44701.12 3.29% 
GEF 6.71 0.27% India 41120.87 3.03% 
Total 2452.28 98.56% Total Exports 1358516.60 72.74% 
            
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
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Table 4.7 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Export Partners (Philippines) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 
Donors 
Disbursements 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Export 
Partners 
Exports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
  
  
   
Japan 6276.72 62.37% United States 70521.27 18.07% 
United 
States 
1066.50 10.60% 
Japan 
63219.69 16.20% 
Australia 
535.38 5.32% 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
34754.54 8.91% 
Germany 474.03 4.71% Hong Kong, China 34034.46 8.72% 
Spain 255.09 2.53% Netherlands 32343.55 8.29% 
France 237.13 2.36% Singapore 29381.00 7.53% 
EU 
Institutions  
210.15 2.09% 
Malaysia 
18476.66 4.74% 
Global Fund  163.94 1.63% Germany 16986.47 4.35% 
Canada 129.27 1.28% Korea, Rep. of 14960.73 3.83% 
Korea 124.23 1.23% Thailand 11846.00 3.04% 
Total 10063.56 94.12% Total Exports 390165.40 73.68% 
            
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
 
Table 4.8 
Comparison of Aid Donors and Export Partners (Thailand) 
2002-2010 
Top 10 Donors 
Disbursement
s ($USm) 
% of 
Total 
Top 10 Export 
Partners 
Exports 
($USm) 
% of 
Total 
  
  
   
Japan 3619.32 69.69% 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
21478.80 10.99% 
United States 301.31 5.80% Japan 20420.40 10.45% 
France 260.58 5.02% United States 20242.60 10.36% 
Global Fund  233.81 4.50% Hong Kong, China 13136.10 6.72% 
Germany 226.96 4.37% Malaysia 10569.30 5.41% 
EU Institutions  154.86 2.98% Australia 9372.10 4.80% 
Australia 58.63 1.13% Singapore 9019.06 4.62% 
Sweden 56.62 1.09% Indonesia 7347.35 3.76% 
Denmark 55.31 1.06% Vietnam 5845.63 2.99% 
Netherlands 34.80 0.67% Netherlands 3644.60 1.87% 
Total 5193.52 96.31% Total Exports 195360.00 61.97% 
            
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
 
 
The evidence discussed above accords with the findings of recent studies 
utilising the Asian International Input–Output Tables to calculate the value content of 
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industries in Southeast Asia.
10
 Kuroiwa (2009) examined a number of production 
networks between Japan, China, Korea and ASEAN nations (including those under 
consideration) for the electronics, automotive and apparel sectors and found a 
dependency on Japan. It becomes apparent therefore that Japan’s aid to all four nations 
was designed to assist these nations in a way that improved the efficiency of these 
production networks. For example, in the electronics industry, the production network 
was improved by shifting labour intensive processes to the nations with the lowest 
labour costs and reducing the transportation costs of electronic parts by improving the 
infrastructure in the nations that formed part of the production network (Kuroiwa, 2009: 
171-172). As a result, it is entirely plausible that the aid was given to ultimately 
improve the donor’s position and not the development of the recipient’s  
domestic markets. 
The experience of Vietnam during 2005 further supports the contention that aid 
is directed for donor purposes. In 2005, there were about 58 Trade-Related Assistance 
(TRA) projects with total disbursements of about US$57 million in Vietnam from 21 
donors but mainly from EU institutions, the United States, the International 
Development Association (a branch of the World Bank), Japan and Australia. These 
projects concentrated on capacity building of stakeholders in trade policy issues and 
support on technical issues in WTO legislation and their incorporation into national 
legislation. In particular, the projects aimed to facilitate Vietnam to fulfil the 
commitments consequent upon WTO accession, to provide information on the technical 
regulations to Vietnamese businesses trying to access foreign markets, and to help 
Vietnam to restructure its economy in the context of WTO membership (Eronen, 
Palmujoki and Virtanen, 2007). This was particularly pertinent for Vietnam whose 
legislation in the context of market economy dealings contained some regulations which 
were not mutually compatible. In theory, there was supposed to be donor coordination 
on TRA projects but this was not the case in practice. One reason was donors pursuing 
their individual interest. Specifically, there was an obvious intention on the donors’ side 
to guarantee their own market access to Vietnam through WTO legislation (Eronen, 
Palmujoki and Virtanen, 2007). This supports the conclusion that donors seek to use 
TRA projects under Aid-for-trade to guarantee adoption and implementation of the 
WTO rules such as national treatment and intellectual property rights, in order to 
support their own business interests.  
In addition to production networks in the electronics, automotive and apparel 
sectors, the use of aid to improve the position of developed nations within regional and 
                                                 
10
 The Asian International Input-Output tables register all international and domestic inter-industry 
transactions in five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore), as 
well as China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States and thus capture the flows of intermediate 
inputs across borders, which are indispensable in calculating cumulative content (Kuroiwa, 2009:148). 
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global supply chains is also seen in the example of the One Village One Product 
(OVOP) program which is one part of the Aid-for-trade initiative. The program seeks to 
combine community capacity building with income generation in order to link them to 
“sustained economic growth” by providing assistance to developing countries to 
“enhance their ability to identify, improve and export their products to Japanese 
markets” (Yonetani, 2009: para. 1, 6; METI, 2012). One application of this scheme in 
Thailand is engaged in promoting and producing a variety of products ranging from 
agriculture to food items, cosmetics, herbal supplements, toiletries, textiles, garments, 
toys, gems and jewelleries, leather products and other handicrafts using local raw 
materials, skill and knowledge following Thai cultural traditions (Routray, 2007: 31). 
The intended result is to produce market driven, redesigned, innovated products to 
“meet modern and urban demand” in international markets (Routray, 2007: 31). 
Similarly, Vietnam has implemented the One Village One Craft program in four 
provinces in co-operation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
which provides marketing and promotion support (JICA, 2011). In addition, JICA has 
shared Japan’s organic cultivation technique in combination with a supply of processing 
technology, electric generators and vaccuum packing machines in order to facilitate the 
processing of buds from perennial tea trees which are popularly cultivated in the 
Northwest into organic tea. This product is gaining demand in developed nations’ 
markets.  
However, the implementation of the initiative has brought challenges. For 
instance, contrary to the OVOP initiative in Thailand, which couples the proliferation of 
village craft with the creation of tourist resorts, Bat Trang on the outskirts of Hanoi has 
not been able to link the development of its traditional pottery occupation with village 
tourism. Instead, there is a problem of rushing to the production of products which sell 
well (JICA, 2011). Notwithstanding the initiative’s focus on funding for small-scale 
enterprises, this lack of forward planning, resulting from the small-scale mindset and 
“self-struggle” in finding markets, means that small-scale enterprises do not expand 
their operations as intended by the proponents of the initiative (JICA, 2011). The lack of 
planning in some craft villages in Vietnam has led to unplanned and excessive growth, 
causing environmental pollution. This cannot be adequately addressed due to a low 
percentage of trained workers and a general lack of expertise in coping with complex 
environmental problems and the consequences of using greater power generation (JICA, 
2011). Aside from negative ramifications arising from the small-enterprise mindset and 
lack of expertise, craft villagers are affected by external factors such as the price of raw 
materials. For example, almost all households in the Phu Vinh commune in Hanoi are 
focused on rattan and bamboo weaving. The increase of the cost of raw materials while 
the product price is controlled by exporting enterprises has meant that the income from 
villagers’ production has decreased substantially (JICA, 2011). The scale of this issue is 
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particularly striking because rattan and bamboo weaving has the largest number of craft 
villages in Vietnam, with more than 710 villages (24% of the total craft villages 
nationwide). In contrast to the intiative’s contribution to improving  the efficiency of the 
production networks and supply chains of the donor, Aid-for-trade funds in Thailand 
and Vietnam have generated limited success and development potential for rural 
recipients of the funds.  
4.2 Composition of Exports 
 
The fact that countries are geographically close does not necessarily mean that each 
country has the same economic structures, needs and problems as its neighbouring 
countries. As a result, there exist other factors shaping Aid-for-trade’s efficacy such as 
the current state and growth potential of the economic sectors which it is directed to, as 
well as the problems that different sectors may have a varying effect on the broader 
development goals for the developing nation’s economy as a whole. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the export structures of the different aid recipients to ascertain the 
relative differences between the export sectors of Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. The additional purpose of this exercise is to further bolster the case that Aid-
for-trade is provided to guarantee strategically important products or natural resources.  
4.2.1 Malaysia 
 
Malaysia’s export sector has transformed significantly over the past five decades. In line 
with the nation’s economic industrialisation, the composition of exports changed from 
mainly agricultural and mining products in the 1960s to largely manufactured goods in 
the 1980s. The development and growth of the manufacturing sector was so rapid that 
by the late 1990s, the sector accounted for more than 80% of total exports. The major 
export sectors in 2010 were machinery and transport equipment (43.90%), mineral fuels 
(15.96%), crude materials (9.46%) and manufactured goods (8.83%), closely followed 
by exports of animal and vegetable oils and fats (8.48%) and chemicals (6.29%) 
(Department of Statistics (Malaysia), 2012). Examining a more detailed account of 
Malaysia’s exports, it was found that while electrical and electronics products continue 
to account for a significant proportion of Malaysia’s total exports (42.4% in 2010), the 
most recent decade since 2000 has seen a diversification of Malaysia’s exports, evident 
in the increase in the share of non-electrical and electronics manufactured exports from 
23.4% to 33.8% (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011:32). Overall, there has been a change in 
the composition of Malaysia’s GDP over the period of 1994 to 2010 (Figure 4.1), 
marked by the increased relative importance of trade. 
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Data source: Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012). 
 
The compositional shift in exports reflects several factors. The first factor is the 
increasing demand for raw materials. Malaysia’s wealth of natural resources, such as 
palm oil, liquefied natural gas, crude oil and natural rubber, demanded by both 
agricultural and mining industries, have accounted for most of the increase in the share 
of commodities in gross exports during the period of 2000-2010 (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2011: 33). The second factor shaping the compositional change in exports is 
the increasing focus on higher value-added manufacturing activities, reflected in the 
increasingly capital-intensive investment pattern in the manufacturing sector (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2011: 33). The local availability of raw materials meant that during 
the period of 2000-2010 Malaysia became a major exporter in key non-electrical and 
electronics manufactured exports such as chemicals and chemical-related products, 
refined petroleum products and rubber products. This change in the composition of 
exports may also be partly due to the trend away from personal computers to newer 
mobile electronic devices such as tablets and smart phones which constitute new 
technology growth sectors in which Malaysia is not substantially involved (Devadason, 
2009:37). The third factor likely to explain Malaysia’s shift away from manufacturing is 
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the increase in competing destinations for FDI
11
 in the same region thereby reducing 
inflows and attracting some outflows from Malaysia. For instance some Chinese–Malay 
investors are shifting their labour-intensive projects to Vietnam (Jensen and Kara, 2011: 
2072). The changing composition of exports particularly in relation to palm oil and 
other raw materials has affected Malaysia’s energy demand (UN, 2012: 4). As a result, 
Aid-for-trade has been targeted at encouraging this sector through funding to power 
generation/non-renewable sources, nuclear power plants and engineering. This would 
explain the reason Aid-for-trade has been relatively more effective for these flows 
within Malaysia and also compared to similar flows to these objectives in Thailand. 
Furthermore, Japan is the major recipient of Malaysia’s palm oil exports and so this 
case study is also supportive of the conclusion that developed nations seek to use Aid-
for-trade to secure important resources (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012: 4).  
Nevertheless, there is a tension between Aid-for-trade flows being directed to 
meeting domestic energy demand and its role in securing strategically important 
resources for the major donors. In particular, Japan is the third largest oil consumer in 
the world following the United States and China and the third-largest net-importer of 
crude oil (EIA, 2012: 2). In light of Japan’s lack of sufficient domestic energy 
resources, Japanese energy companies have actively engaged in crude oil and natural 
gas projects overseas, and provide engineering, construction, financial, and project 
management services to such projects. As a result, Japan is one of the major exporters 
of energy-sector capital equipment, and has a prominent energy research and 
development program supported by the government in order to increase the country’s 
energy security (METI, 2010: 3; EIA, 2012: 2). Two factors have exacerbated Japan’s 
need to geographically diversify its energy resource imports. First, as of the recent 
decade Japan has been increasingly altering its energy sources from Iran to Malaysia 
and Vietnam, after reducing imports from Iran in light of current and impending US and 
EU sanctions (EIA, 2012: 5). Second, after the Fukushima incident, Japan has been 
increasingly dependent on imports of crude oil for use in power plants, substituting the 
lost nuclear fuel for power with low sulphur, heavy crude oil from sources in Malaysia 
as well as Vietnam (EIA, 2012: 5). Therefore, in light of Japan’s reliance on access to 
energy resources it is likely that Aid-for-trade is provided to these sectors to secure the 
required resources, implying that it may not be directed in the most development- or 
growth-enhancing fashion for domestic-oriented sectors.  
  
                                                 
11
 This issue will be considered in Section 5.2. 
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4.2.2 Philippines 
 
In the 1970s, average per capita income of the Philippines was close to that of Malaysia. 
During that decade, the two countries had similar economic structures, with the 
agricultural sector representing up to 30% of GDP and industry accounting for about 
30–35% (World Bank, 2007). However, three decades later, Malaysia was among the 
most industrialised countries in the region, but the Philippines stayed behind with 
slower growth and structural transformation, characterised by a slow decline of the 
agricultural sector and relative stagnation in others (ADB, 2012). The Philippines’ 
industrial sector has been near stagnant over the last three decades after peaking 
between 1979–1984 with an average of nearly 40% before receding to around 30% by 
2000 and rising slightly to 32.6% in 2010 (ADB, 2012). The agricultural output share 
declined from 22.0% in 1992 to 12.3% of GDP in 2010. This was due largely to the 
decline of its historically important cash crops, sugar and coconut, in combination with 
the accelerated decline of forestry output resulting from the disappearance of virtually 
all the primary forests since the 1990s (Balasacan and Hill, 2003: 11, 15). Thus, despite 
employing almost 40% of its workforce in the agricultural sector, the Philippines has 
not experienced any significant cash-crop export boom, unlike the boom of palm oil in 
Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011: 15), rubber in Thailand (FAO, 2011: 3) and 
coffee and cashews in Vietnam (FAO, 2006). However, there has been notable growth 
in the services sector which now accounts for 55.7% and is the largest contributor to 
growth (ADB, 2012). Overall trade accounts for 17.0% of GDP. The current picture for 
the Philippines’ exports is particularly striking: manufactures constitute 88.0% of total 
exports, with the remaining shares comprised by mineral products (4.0%), coconut 
products (3.0%), petroleum (1.0%) and other agro-based products comprising the 
remaining 4.0% (BSP, 2012).  
There are a number of explanations for the effect of the Philippines’ sectoral 
structure on the efficacy of Aid-for-trade within its borders. While the manufacturing 
sectors are mostly open, sectors such as transportation, energy, telecommunications and 
primary sectors in the Philippines remain substantially more restrictive than in Malaysia 
and Vietnam (World Bank, 2010). For instance, in the Philippines a foreign company 
cannot mortgage leased land or use it as collateral to buy production equipment. 
Moreover, Filipino law gives a preference to local products and/or Filipino-controlled 
enterprises in the bid evaluation process for public sector purchases. Furthermore, if 
Filipino consultants work for foreigners on technical projects the law requires that they 
are the lead consultants (BEBA, 2012). In addition, the Philippines has a vast amount of 
mineral and geothermal energy resources (ABARES, 2010: 209). Until the mid-2000s, 
foreign capital participation in these industries was restricted to 40% by the Filipino 
Constitution (World Bank, 2010: 141). At present, foreign capital participation in scale 
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exploration, development and commercial exploration of mineral and geothermal 
resources may be allowed up to 100% but only on the condition that the investor enters 
into a financial or technical assistance agreement with the government, which requires a 
minimum investment of $50,000,000 and is granted for a 25-year term (World Bank, 
2010: 141).Given the composition of exports and the fact that sectors targeted by Aid-
for-trade in the Philippines are also the most restrictive it seems reasonable that its 
effect has been sporadic and ambiguous.  
4.2.3 Thailand 
 
In 2010, similar to the Philippines, Thailand’s exports were overwhelmingly constituted 
by manufacturing (85.21%) which was mostly comprised of electronics and electrical 
products, followed by agriculture (8.60%) with the remainder comprising of fishery, 
forestry and mining (Bank of Thailand, 2012). Considering this in the context of the 
period 2003-2010, there has been a rapid increase in both manufacturing and agriculture 
exports, particularly after 2009 (Figure 4.2). However, despite a steady rise in the 
manufacturing share of GDP from 25.91% in 1994 to 31.29% in 2010, the share of 
agriculture has been declining. In the 1960s, more than 50% of the country income was 
derived from agriculture, while in 2010 agriculture constituted 7.15% of GDP. Despite 
agriculture’s decline, it remains economically important. In 2010 agriculture employed 
40.7% of the Thai labour force (CIA, 2012) in comparison to 13.2% of the population 
employed in industry and 46.1% in services. The reason for the continued persistence of 
agriculture is that Thailand’s climate and soil conditions permit the cultivation of a wide 
range of crops. Thailand’s status as a major net agricultural exporter has shaped its 
agricultural trade policy (Warr, 2008: 249). Aside from the traditionally important rice 
plantations, over the last number of decades the country has undertaken a long-term 
strategy for industrial crops development – such as rubber, coconut, oil palm and coffee 
(FAO, 2011: 1). In addition, Thailand was ranked as the world’s number one exporter of 
processed chicken and shrimp, processed and canned pineapple as well as tuna in 2008 
(FAO, 2011: 3). 
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Data source: Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); Bank of Thailand (2012). 
 
Bearing in mind the composition of exports of Thailand, there a number of 
possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of Aid-for-trade flows directed to air 
transport, rail transport and road transport to date. One perspective is that the long-term 
nature of such projects means that the impact will not be immediately evident in the 
targeted sectors. Support for this is found in the larger correlation co-efficients for each 
examined sector in Thailand when comparing aid provided in a year with economic 
activity in the following year instead of economic activity in the current year (Table 4.9 
compared with Table 3.12).
12
 
 
  
                                                 
12
 A comparison of Table 4.9 and Table 3.12 indicate that this was also true for Malaysia but the opposite 
was true for the Philippines and Vietnam.  
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Table 4.9 
Correlation Co-efficients Between Aid to Sector and Sector Economic Activity in the 
Next Year 
Sector/Country Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
     
Trade 0.02 0.40 0.37 0.62 
Transport -0.15 0.87 -0.36 0.94 
Finance 0.61 0.61 0.33 -0.33 
Electricity 0.72 0.47 0.82 0.91 
     
Data source: OECD Creditor Reporting Database (OECD, 2012a); OECD Aid Activity Database (OECD, 
2012b); Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012), author’s calculations. 
 
Another perspective is that aid directed to air transport would be particularly effective 
for time-sensitive products (WTO and IDE-JETRO, 2011: 32). An examination of 
Thailand’s export composition discussed above suggests that the extent to which 
considerations of time-sensitivity apply to the major export sectors is not abundantly 
clear. While Thailand is a major exporter of foodstuffs and agricultural products in line 
with the national strategy and policy to serve as the “kitchen of the world” (FAO, 2011: 
3), raw material exports such as rubber and palm oil and electronics and electrical 
exports are not overly time-sensitive so the benefits from the increased availability of 
air transport would not necessarily accrue to such sectors. By contrast, even though 
tourism, one of the most important sectors of the economy, was substantially curtailed 
by the political instability in 2006 and 2009 (VOA, 2009), greater air transport capacity 
should encourage the sector in the future. 
4.2.4 Vietnam 
 
Since 1986, Vietnam has significantly reformed its centrally-planned economy into a 
market-oriented economy through the Doi Moi (renovation) policy. This has involved 
the removal of trade restrictions, reflected in Vietnam’s increasing revealed openness to 
trade discussed earlier. The “contemporary Vietnam” which emerged after the early 
1990s was viewed as a success, emerging as an exporter of crude oil as well as labour-
intensive light manufactured goods (Fforde, 2009: 484; Thanh and Duong, 2011: 121). 
Specifically, in contrast to the slight decline of rubber sectors resulting from greater 
competition from Thailand, other sectors have become significantly more competitive, 
especially in recent years, including furniture and the manufacture of furnishing parts, 
articles of apparel and clothing accessories, agricultural products, primarily coffee, tea, 
cocoa and spices and particularly aquaculture products like fish, crustaceans and 
mollusc (Thanh and Duong, 2011: 121). During the Doi Moi process, the government 
increasingly recognised the value of fishery products as a consequence of rising global 
demand for seafood, particularly from Japan which transformed from being the largest 
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exporter of fish to its largest importer in the last few decades of the 20th century 
(Swartz, Sumaila, Watson and Pauly, 2010: 1368). Despite being the second-largest rice 
exporter after Thailand, the share of agriculture in Vietnam’s GDP has reduced 
gradually as a proportion from 27.4% in 1994 to 20% in 2009 (ADB, 2012), while the 
share of fishery increased from 10.25% in 1995 to 12.55% in 2004. Including fishery 
and forestry, the agricultural sector employed 48% of Vietnam’s labour force in 2011 
which confirms its structural importance as a source of income for the majority of its 
rural population, which represented 70% in 2010 (CIA, 2012). 
The composition of exports for the year 2010 confirms the overall trend (see 
Figure 4.3) in the change in export sectors, showing light industrial and handicraft 
goods taking the largest proportion (45.00%), followed by exports of heavy industrial 
products and minerals (28.00%), agricultural and forest products (16.00%) and aquatic 
products (7.00%). The remaining 4.00% was non-monetary gold (General Statistics 
Office (Vietnam), 2012). Exports of crude oil remain highly significant in light of the 
rising energy demand by its biggest export markets, Japan (discussed earlier), China and 
the United States (Luong, 2007: 168).  
 
 
Data source: Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012); General Statistics Office (Vietnam) (2012). 
 
Considering the structure of Vietnam’s export sector offers an insight into 
possible explanations for the relative effectiveness of Aid-for-trade flows directed to 
road transport, electrical transmission/distribution and power generation/non-renewable 
sources in Vietnam compared to the same flows to the other countries under 
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examination. Vietnam’s high untapped natural reserves of oil, coal and gas (Eronen, 
Palmujoki and Virtanen, 2007: 61) make it an attractive, geographically close 
alternative source of energy for Japan, akin to Malaysia. However, virtually all of 
Vietnam’s oil production is exported because the country has no major oil refining 
facilities. Although an agreement was signed in 2007 between PetroVietnam, Japanese 
partners and Kuwait for a future refinery at Nghi Son in Thanh Hoa, about 1,200km 
north of the oilfields, there is still a logistical transport problem for crude oil and refined 
products (DBISFCO, 2011: 8). Therefore, Aid-for-trade flows aimed at improving the 
infrastructure linkages between the oil fields and refineries under construction may 
improve the exploration and processing of the resources which would contribute to the 
expansion of this export sector.  However, unlike the Aid-for-trade flows to road 
transport, electrical transmission/distribution and power generation/non-renewable 
sources, the Aid-for-trade to small and medium-sized enterprises was found to be much 
less effective in Vietnam. The downfalls of this initiative in Vietnam in comparison to 
its success in Thailand were discussed in relation to the funding to traditional 
handicrafts and textiles under the OVOP initiative in 4.1.2. 
As discussed previously, the structure of Vietnam’s exports also shows an 
increasing emphasis on fisheries, similar to Thailand. However, Vietnam has received 
substantially more Aid-for-trade flows to fishery development and agricultural water 
resources than Thailand, where such flows had a weak negative effect for the fishery 
and agricultural export industries. It is therefore necessary to examine the reason for the 
discrepancy between the countries. In Vietnam, up to the beginning of the 1990s all 
companies were state-owned and all export trade was a state monopoly, with Seaprodex 
being the first enterprise allowed to export fisheries products (Eronen, Palmujoki and 
Virtanen, 2007: 68). Today, while there are still seafood processors in the northern part 
of Vietnam who export shrimp through Seaprodex, in the southern areas virtually all 
processors are able to export their products directly (Thanh and Nguyen, 2011: 124). 
The recent history of private companies and the rapid increase in demand for seafood 
products placed Vietnam’s export markets in a favourable position. However, the 
prolonged war meant that Vietnam experienced a shortage of the equipment and 
facilities necessary to support a growing seafood industry. Moreover, Vietnam did not 
have substantial amounts of foreign currency to purchase the requisite equipment. As a 
result, Japan began providing trucks, freezers and engines, taking seafood as payment 
(Kagawa and Bailey, 2006: 312).  
In contrast to Vietnam, Thailand has emerged as one of Southeast Asia’s “Asian 
Tigers” with relatively good human and infrastructure capital and a growing industrial 
base, supported by freer financial regulations (BEBA, 2012). At present, Japan relies on 
Thailand for seafood products, but Thailand’s wage rates and costs of production are 
becoming increasingly less competitive in comparison to Vietnam (Kagawa and Bailey, 
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2006: 314). However, because the diet of the Japanese consumers consists of high 
amounts of raw seafood, Japanese sanitary and phytosanitary standards are becoming 
increasingly high, with compulsory testing of shrimps and prawn produced in Thailand 
and Vietnam ordered by the Health Minister pursuant to the Food Sanitation Act 
(JETRO, 2011: 2). Thailand has responded to this by competing on the basis of superior 
quality and producing highly processed products but for Vietnamese seafood processors 
this constitutes a considerable challenge (Le, 2010: 228). Therefore, Aid-for-trade 
assistance targeted at fishery development can be expected to have a greater effect on 
the ability of Vietnamese seafood exporters to meet the standards of their primary 
buyers given their relative disadvantage to Thai seafood exporters in meeting  
these standards.  
Thus, this Chapter examined a number of reasons for the ambiguity of the effect 
of Aid-for-trade on growth and exports found in the cross-country and country-specific 
studies. Specifically, a comparison of top ODA donors and import partners of Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam revealed a persistent relationship between trade-
related ODA and exports from the donor country imported by the aid recipient. This is 
corroborated by the literature demonstrating that some types of Aid-for-trade are easier 
to informally tie than other forms of ODA, primarily flows under the trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity-building categories, which involve the employment of 
donor country experts in giving advice on trade policy and regulation and trade 
development; flows under trade-related infrastructure which are associated with the 
importation of capital goods, means of production and technology from the donor; and 
flows categorised as “building productive capacity”, which entail obtaining specialised 
advice from donor consultants and experts. In addition, evidence was found for donors’ 
economic considerations tending to form the basis for providing Aid-for-trade through 
the comparison of the top ten aid donors and export partners. Two such considerations 
were identified through the examination of the composition of exports and GDP of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam: first, improving the efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of networks of production or supply chains for goods destined for 
developed countries’ markets; and second, securing strategic products and resources 
through aid which may entail either an explicit obligation to sell to the donor country, or 
an implicit obligation to sell to the donor as a means of securing future aid flows. 
However, notwithstanding the positive effect of Aid-for-trade on growth in some 
sectors, the donor-centric nature of the initiative means that there is no guarantee that its 
wider economic development objectives will be achieved. 
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5. Factors Determining the Efficacy of Aid-for-Trade on Economic 
Development 
 
Notwithstanding the previous analysis about the effect of Aid-for-trade on growth and 
exports, it is necessary to emphasise that GDP and export growth are not synonymous 
with economic development. Even if one was to accept that Aid-for-trade has limited 
success in facilitating greater exports in the sectors that it targets, that does not 
necessarily imply that the purported wider development or poverty reduction goals of 
the initiative can be and are being achieved. Therefore, it is essential to analyse the 
connection between Aid-for-trade, development and poverty reduction, with an 
emphasis on the factors shaping its effectiveness on development in Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, in particular foreign ownership of enterprises 
benefiting from Aid-for-trade (5.2), social phenomena not captured by conventional 
poverty statistics (5.3), the ethnic dimensions of employment in different sectors and 
poverty (5.4) and the environmental considerations of the sustainability of export-led 
growth (5.5). 
5.1 Connection Between Aid-for-Trade, Development and Poverty Reduction 
 
As identified in Section 4, support from Aid-for-trade tends to go to those industries 
already with a comparative advantage rather than to non-comparative advantage 
industries.
13
 Therefore, the Aid-for-trade initiative seems to operate on the basis that 
whoever has economic resources will be given more, and whoever does not will lose 
out. Preliminary evidence of this is reflected in the negative correlation between Aid-
for-trade and income inequality measured by the Gini co-efficient for three of the seven 
countries for which data was available (see Section 3.1). For example, Aid-for-trade 
does not reach the most poor in rural areas even though it is focused on air, rail and road 
transport development in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The reason 
is that the funds are focused on developing trade routes that already exist rather than 
building connections between rural and urban areas (WTO, UNESCAP and OECD, 
2011: 13, 17; AusAID, 2010: 2). To a limited extent it may benefit those with domestic-
oriented business/general population located in proximity to infrastructure development 
as well as exporters, though this is quite uncertain as established above. But it does not 
assist those working in agriculture in more remote areas. As a result, rather than 
achieving its broader development goals, the circular nature of the initiative (giving 
support to those who already are doing well to make them perform even better) is likely 
to deepen current inequalities rather than develop all sectors equitably. This is 
                                                 
13
 Revealed comparative advantage is defined as the dominant export of a country divided by total exports 
(Trung, 2002:4).  
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exacerbated by Aid-for-trade containing no mechanism to compensate the losers, or 
even adequately identify and quantify the losses of those who suffer through the process 
of adjustment. 
A related point is that even though growth in an industry can contribute to 
poverty reduction if it remains competitive, measures improving competitiveness and 
thus growth often require a reduction in the number of workers employed. This could be 
poverty-increasing, at least in the short run, given the risk of structural unemployment. 
In Vietnam, the employment effects of textile and garment production have been mixed 
as the textile industry has been compelled to reduce its workforce in order to improve its 
weak competitive position (Nadvi et al., 2004: 113,120). While the industry’s 
productivity has substantially increased, employment has declined, except in the case of 
some foreign-owned companies. Importantly, the opposite is true of the garment 
industry in Vietnam. International companies in the garment industry, burdened by 
rising labour costs, have increasingly shifted production to low-wage countries like 
Vietnam while leaving such operations as design, branding and marketing in their own 
hands (Knutsen, 2004, Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). The resultant export boom has led to 
higher output, labour productivity and employment, contributing to poverty reduction. 
Much of these employment gains have been captured by women, including migrants 
from poorer regions (Nadvi et al., 2004: 111).  These conflicting examples demonstrate 
that the relationship between growth and poverty-reduction/economic development is 
far from straightforward. This implies that Aid-for-trade has not always created the 
improvements it is designed to, even where it has encouraged growth in exports.  
5.2 Foreign Ownership of Enterprises Benefitting from Aid-for-Trade 
 
Another factor influencing the effect of Aid-for-trade on the economic development of 
the recipient country is the foreign ownership of enterprises benefitting from Aid-for-
trade funding. It may be that the sectors that receive funds are actually controlled by 
foreign owned business so that the aid is designed to kill two birds with one stone: 
public perception regarding assisting developing nations and winning political support 
from domestic entrepreneurs who operate overseas. Furthermore, the income growth 
that results from an increase in sector exports may end up in foreign hands and not in 
the hands of those who most need it. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
discuss the extent of this phenomenon, it is worth highlighting that, contrary to the 
advocates of Aid-for-trade, attracting FDI does not necessarily have positive 
ramifications for local exporters in developing countries. Therefore, this point will be 
illustrated by reference to trade-related assistance on a broader industry level in 
Vietnam and a company-level example involving the use of Aid-for-trade assistance for 
an expansion project of a private company. 
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On a larger scale, under the Hanoi Infrastructure Building Project, Japanese 
trade-related ODA funded the building of drainage facilities, peripheral roads, and other 
infrastructure to create a favourable environment for operating factories in the Thang 
Long Industrial Park, one of the largest industrial parks in Vietnam. Of the 73 
companies occupying the industrial park, 71 are Japanese. Most of the products and 
parts produced in this industrial park are exported to other countries, and the total 
amount in 2010 accounted for 3.2% of all exports from Vietnam (MFA, 2012: 15). 
Likewise, on the level of individual companies, a case-study provided by the OECD and 
WTO of a foreign-owned private enterprise benefiting from Aid-for-trade is the case 
story of Grand‐Place, a Belgian-owned, Japanese-affiliated manufacturer specializing in 
chocolate and chocolate decorations (Grand-Palace Group, 2012). In 2007, Grand-
Palace obtained a loan of 650 000 euros to finance building a new plant and the 
acquisition of a second production line dedicated to manufacturing cocoa butter sourced 
from cocoa plantations in Vietnam. The plant, inaugurated in 2009, produces 3 000 tons 
of chocolate per year. However, even though Grand-Palace marketed the first chocolate 
“Made in Vietnam”, manufactured entirely in Vietnam, it continues to export most of its 
products to Japan and North America (Liessens, 2011). Therefore, the evidence suggests 
that both at the wider industry and individual company level it is possible that the 
exporting enterprises that benefit from Aid-for-trade funding are not necessarily locally 
owned and thus the broader development goal of Aid-for-trade of fostering local 
exporters may not eventuate, contrary to the prediction of the model of progressive 
specialisation used to justify the initiative. 
5.3 Social Phenomena not Captured by Conventional Poverty Statistics 
 
The discussion so far has focussed on the income objectives of the Aid-for-trade 
initiative through export-led growth but the initiative also aims to achieve wider 
development objectives, including social outcomes. Turning to this point, even if one 
assumed that Aid-for-trade unambiguously increased incomes through higher exports in 
the face of the ambiguous results obtained in Section 3, there is little reason to conclude 
that it must achieve its wider development objectives. Higher incomes would most 
definitely reduce poverty by traditional income-based poverty measures, but these 
overlook many different social problems which are linked to the processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation.
14 
 
The point is illustrated by the phenomenon of rural-to-urban migration. Rural 
dwellers migrate in order to seek higher-paying jobs in urban centres, particularly in 
well-performing export industries in contrast to declining agriculture. If migrants are 
successful in finding better jobs this phenomenon is often credited to the process of 
                                                 
14
 Urbanisation refers to the migration of workers to urban areas in search of work. 
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economic development (see Section 2.1.1). However, evidence from the Philippines 
shows that the occupational profiles of migrants are diverse, with a large proportion of 
male migrants ending up in manual labour/transportation work or crafts and trades, 
which are not high-earning occupations (Quisumbing and McNiven, 2006). A similar 
phenomenon also occurred in Vietnam where, despite the relatively good performance 
of Vietnamese agriculture, rural employment did not grow fast enough, causing 
migration to urban areas in search of employment in relatively better performing Aid-
for-trade- and FDI-financed factories (Eronen, Palmujoki and Virtanen, 2007).   
However, this type of migration was directed to industrial parks in peri-urban 
areas rather than cities as such, and as a result employees live temporarily in 
“guesthouse” accommodation arranged by their employers (Eronen, Palmujoki and 
Virtanen, 2007: 97). While these migrants are not necessarily poor when compared to 
the average Vietnamese income level, they often encounter poor living conditions and 
suffer from a lack of access to social services, healthcare and education (Duong, Linh 
and Thao, 2011). Likewise, a lack of social protection for migrants in Thailand in 
combination with disparities in educational levels has meant that “poor rural households 
tend to produce poor migrants” (Amare, Hohfeld, Jitsuchon and Waibel, 2012: 57). 
Thus, all these examples challenge the ability of Aid-for-trade to achieve its 
development goal of poverty reduction through its desired development mechanism of 
export-led growth and highlight that its success is contingent on factors it does not 
directly address.  
5.4 Ethnic Dimensions of Employment in Different Sectors and Poverty 
 
In addition to the problems associated with migration to export-oriented industrial areas, 
the ethnic dimensions of economic activity and poverty are not accounted for under the 
Aid-for-trade initiative. Different ethnic groups are employed in various sectors of the 
economy and so those groups employed in the sectors that directly benefit from Aid-for-
trade, or from the export-led growth supposedly encouraged by Aid-for-trade will 
benefit the most. But these groups are not necessarily the neediest. For instance, 
Vietnam’s population consists of a variety of ethnic groups, distributed unevenly across 
provinces and cities, with a number of ethnic minorities residing in mountain tribes 
(UNFPA, 2011: 14). The uneven geographic distribution of ethnic groups is mirrored by 
the proportions of workers of different ethnic groups employed in various economic 
sectors. The poverty rate is low among the Chinese population and in the Kinh ethnic 
majority, who have a higher proportion of people working in state sectors, private 
sectors and economic sectors involving foreign investment than the rest of the ethnic 
groups as well as a higher proportion than the average level of the country (UNFPA, 
2011: 36). However, in the Northern Uplands and North Central and Central Highlands 
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where agricultural development has been slow, or amongst indigenous mountain tribes, 
the poverty incidence remains extremely high (Eronen, Palmujoki and Virtanen, 2007). 
By contrast, in the Philippines except in a limited number of regions, indigenous 
peoples are not likely to comprise the absolute poorest groups, using conventional 
socioeconomic indicators. Rather, there is a growing risk of impoverishment, as their 
traditional lands and natural resources come under increasing threat (Plant, 2002: 14). 
Thus, the success of Aid-for-trade in reducing poverty is limited because economic 
growth alone is not sufficient to address the spatial and ethnic dimensions of 
employment and poverty.  
5.5 Sustainability of Export-Led Growth – Environmental Considerations 
 
In addition to social phenomena overlooked by the Aid-for-trade discussed above, there 
are a number of environmental considerations linked to the sustainability of export-led 
growth that affect the achievement of broader development goals under the initiative. 
There are considerable environmental detriments arising from expanding export-led 
production. In the countries under examination, the increase in efficiency in agriculture 
has been realised in two ways: first, by introducing new types of species, fertilizers and 
pesticides, and second, by introducing new cultivation branches through shifting from 
cereals to cash crops such as palm oil, coffee, cocoa, cashew and tea, which have 
increased the value of agricultural output (FAO, 2006).  
Specifically, in response to the growing global demand for edible oils and 
animal proteins in the last decade or two there has been a tremendous increase in the 
areas under oil crops cultivation, particularly of palm oil (UN, 2012: 5). Malaysia is the 
largest producer and exporter of palm oil, and, together with Indonesia, produces nearly 
80% of the world’s palm oil, used in cooking oil, fats and as chemical derivatives for 
detergent (UN, 2012: 10). However, the conversion of lower productivity crops to high-
yielding oil palm has been the cause for environmental concern, such as soil erosion 
following forest-clearing and indiscriminate application of chemical or inorganic 
fertilisers to achieve higher yields. Moreover, erosion promotes river siltation which 
results in flood-prone waterways and problems for aquatic organisms. In addition, palm 
oil mills generate large quantities of effluent with high biochemical oxygen demand 
which when discharged untreated into watercourses has negative consequences for 
aquatic life and the domestic water supply (UN, 2012: 21). 
Similar to the disappearance of virtually all the primary forests since the 1990s 
in the Philippines (Balasacan and Hill, 2003: 11, 15) in accordance with the World 
Bank-promoted integration of Thailand's agriculture into the international economic 
system the country expanded and diversified its agricultural production by clearing 
upland forests for export products which were demanded by Japan, Taiwan and the EU 
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(Warr, 2008: 250). Further, not only did these patterns of economic development 
through export-led growth promoted by the Thai state and its international benefactors 
lead to land degradation through deforestation which caused flood-drought cycles that 
have cut into fertility and crop growth in both new and old areas of cultivation, but also 
contributed to the displacement of many communities, who have been forced to migrate 
because they have lost their agricultural source of livelihoods (Lohmann, 1993; Amare, 
Hohfeld, Jitsuchon and Waibel, 2012). Acute negative environmental impacts have also 
been felt in Thailand and Vietnam through the increasing emphasis on lucrative 
aquaculture exports, particularly shrimp-farming which requires high volumes of 
concentrated saline water that degrades adjoining rice paddies and generates high 
volumes of organic waste that acts as a pollutant when discharged into waterways at 
harvest time (Szuster, 2006: 86). Although major financial gains were made through the 
reorientation, the gains were ultimately transferred away from rural areas, concentrating 
in trading centres, meaning that urban investors ultimately profited more from shrimp-
farming for export than farmers (Belton and Little, 2008: 123). Therefore, as these 
examples have demonstrated, support to export industries as the basis of development 
does not necessarily benefit the domestic-oriented production, the environment or the 
workers in the host country. Even though the currency devaluations from the Asian and 
Global financial crises have assisted these countries by improving short-term export 
competitiveness (Lucarelli, 2002: 501), in the longer term this deepened Thailand’s 
reliance on cash crop exports and peripheral status, with slim chances at receiving 
sufficient technological skills in order to progress to higher levels of development, 
contrary to the flying geese model (Section 2.2). 
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6. Conclusion: Reconceptualising the Aid-for-Trade Initiative - the 
Need to Provide a Sound Theoretical Framework and Avenues for 
Future Research 
 
On its surface, Aid-for-trade appears to signify a reorientation in the orthodox paradigm 
that trade liberalisation is a powerful engine for economic growth. Proponents argue 
that the agenda has been reframed to prioritise development, globalisation, poverty 
reduction and sustainability, conceding that there is a need for assistance to developing 
countries to facilitate a greater development impact. However, having situated Aid-for-
trade within the context of the development of economic theory relating to 
development, growth and trade and, having undertaken empirical cross-country analysis 
and country-specific analysis of the effect of Aid-for-trade flows in Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, including a critical discussion of the factors that 
shape the efficacy of Aid-for-trade on its primary goals, growth and exports, and wider 
development goals, it appears that the purported development focus and effect of Aid-
for-trade is nominal. The key priority of the initiative remains reforming relevant 
legislation and building capacity in order to facilitate the increased access of donor 
countries to developing countries’ markets and ultimately improve the donor’s 
economic and political position. As a result, Aid-for-trade is not directed in ways that 
maximise the recipients’ development. This is reflected in the statistical analyses 
conducted in this thesis.  
The literature review and, particularly the application of competing explanations 
for the economic success in East Asia, demonstrated that the belief in trade as a 
necessary element of development is not universal. Despite this, the economic success 
of East Asian countries has been used by the orthodox neoclassical-neoliberal approach 
to maintain the “logically flawless conclusion that exports lead to development” (Page, 
2006: 17-18).  As with the arguments of modernisation theorists, discussed in Section 
2.1.1, supporters of the trade liberalisation agenda rely on the phenomenon of 
progressive specialisation under the product cycle model which they argue allows firms 
to respond to competitive pressures and progress from specialising in simple goods to 
technologically advanced capital goods if trade is as free as possible. Moreover, 
pursuant to the flying geese model, the role of Japan’s ODA in the region has been 
framed as key for upgrading technology and agricultural development, and as a catalyst 
for FDI and industrial agglomeration and development. 
Crucially, the literature review also revealed that structural-institutionalist and 
core-periphery arguments present a persuasive counter-argument to the orthodox 
framework. In contrast to the mainstream trade liberalisation argument, structural-
institutionalist approaches point to the role of state industrial planning, import barriers 
and capital controls in explaining the success of East Asian development. Furthermore, 
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core-periphery arguments challenge the teleological prediction of the orthodox 
framework that it is through export-led growth that countries reach a “mature” stage of 
development (cf. Section 2.2), by demonstrating that the production and exports of East 
Asian countries remained greatly dependent on the imports of capital goods and 
technologies from Japan. In particular, ASEAN has been Japan’s important supplier of 
raw materials, a production base for manufacturing industries with lower-cost labour 
and a market for manufactures. Consequently, core-periphery frameworks have argued 
that there is an incentive for Japan to preserve the pool of cheaper labour in East Asia, 
facilitate FDI and regionalised production, while innovating to enhance productivity 
only to the extent that Japan’s competitive position is not compromised.  Moreover, 
core-periphery arguments suggest that, while agricultural and technological assistance 
through Japanese ODA may be conducive to development in some parts of East Asia, it 
is also likely to facilitate entrapment in particular industries. Thus, rather than Japanese 
firms vacating sectors which have achieved maturity, a new regional division of labour 
has been established, based on production networks and supply chains that ultimately 
benefit Japan rather than the development of the receiving country.  
These theoretical positions and historical considerations suggested that Aid-for-
trade would not likely be directed in a way that would improve development in 
developing nations in the East Asian region. Accordingly, this thesis conducted two 
empirical studies in order to establish whether or not this was the case. The cross-
country analysis tested for the effect of Aid-for-trade on growth, exports and other 
development indicators using both summary statistics and panel data approaches. Upon 
examination, the results did not suggest that there was an unambiguous, positive 
relationship between Aid-for-trade flows and development indicators. While in Vietnam 
the strongest correlation between aid flows and growth and exports was obtained, the 
results for the cross-country analysis were confirmed when examining individual 
sectors benefitting from Aid-for-trade flows in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. No clear, positive relationship was found, with some sectors experiencing a 
fall in activity upon, and consequent to, the receipt of larger aid flows. The ambiguity 
across countries and sectors was largely explained as being the result of aid being tied 
by the donor country, the differing places each country had within regional and global 
production networks and domestic economic structures as uncovered by each country’s 
composition of exports (Section 4.2). Evidence for these factors was found through an 
analysis of the origins and direction of Aid-for-trade flows which established a 
connection between a developing nation’s major aid donors and its major import/export 
partners (Section 4).  
Bearing all of this in mind, the central point of this thesis has been to critically 
discuss specific applications of Aid-for-trade in order to uncover its donor-centric 
nature. It is now possible to demonstrate this central characteristic of the Aid-for-trade 
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initiative in all of its objectives as set out by the ADB and WTO (2011: 29-33). The first 
objective is to promote WTO accession and economic reforms (that is, liberalisation and 
adoption of WTO-consistent policies and practices). As was suggested in Section 2.3.2, 
the Aid-for-trade flows associated with this objective were only designed to compensate 
developing nations for a weak Doha Round of negotiations and maintain the relevance 
of the WTO. A second objective is to build trade capacity involving technical assistance 
relating to knowledge, skills and institutions that would help to assess the merits of 
policy options and seize opportunities for trade expansion. Section 4.1.1 indicated that it 
is entirely possible that the Aid-for-trade flows in this category are tied in the sense that 
developing countries are formally or informally obliged to obtain technical advice by 
employing consultants and experts from donor countries. In relation to the third 
objective to develop infrastructure and strengthen economic corridors, Section 4.1.2 
provided evidence that the majority of the flows in this category are directed to improve 
the efficiency of production networks and supply chains primarily for the benefit of 
donor countries. Evidence is also given regarding the unequal distribution of these flows 
to improve existing trade routes (5.1) and existing foreign-owned production facilities 
(5.2), which casts doubt on the ability of Aid-for-trade to achieve its wider development 
objectives. For the fourth objective of upgrading competitiveness through increasing 
productivity through export diversification and trade-related agriculture, it appears that 
the flows have been directed towards the development of cash crops such as palm oil, 
coffee, cocoa, tea and spices, lucrative aquaculture products and energy resources 
including crude oil and natural gas (Sections 4.2.1-4). Given the importance of these 
products for donor countries, this suggests that the aid is given to secure these resources 
rather than for the sole purpose of the recipient’s development. The fifth objective is to 
facilitate FDI and other private flows because foreign direct investment and other 
private flows are constructed as “international resources for development” (UN, 2002: 
9). However, there is scarce evidence that FDI is undertaken with benevolence to the 
host country. The negative ramifications of these profit-centred motivations were 
discussed in Section 5.3. 
  It is important to acknowledge that, even where economic growth has increased, 
the donor-centric nature of Aid-for-trade means that there is no guarantee that the 
initiative’s wider objectives will be achieved due to the failure to consider wider socio-
economic factors. These factors were categorised into those relating to income 
inequality (5.1), foreign ownership in the sectors receiving aid (5.2), the welfare 
consequences of urbanisation and rural-urban migration as a result of export-led 
development (5.3), the ethnic dimensions to economic activity in the developing nations 
under examination (5.4) and long-term environmental consequences from pursuing 
export-led growth (5.5). Evidence for each of these factors was consistently found in 
78 
 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. This casts even more doubt on the 
potential of the policy to improve development.  
Thus, the Aid-for-trade initiative must be re-conceptualised. Its impact on 
growth and exports in East Asian developing nations has been ambiguous. Furthermore, 
there are seemingly insurmountable obstacles facing the policy achieving its wider 
development objectives. While the full re-conceptualisation of Aid-for-trade is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, future research may take the following matters into account. 
First, the place each developing nation within East Asia and particularly in 
ASEAN has within regional and global production networks must be acknowledged. 
The framework setting out how Aid-for-trade flows are to work should be adapted 
accordingly. In other words, industries across the world are comprised of sectors with 
varying skill and input characteristics and requirements. However, within this 
production network framework, the core-periphery approach has a limited application to 
these changed production processes because at the sector level, no single country 
represents the “core” or “periphery” because different countries can occupy a different 
space in the production networks for each sector. The analysis regarding the 
composition of exports provides evidence of the role this complex web of relationships 
for each sector as well as evidence of the effect of this on the efficacy of Aid-for-trade. 
As a result, a more nuanced core-periphery framework will be needed to provide sound 
foundations for how Aid-for-trade is provided to developing countries.  
Second, it would be desirable to address the continuing dependence on the 
demand from developed nations that the policy encourages. The region’s experience 
during the Asian Financial Crisis and the GFC uncovers the volatility that is induced by 
focusing on export-led growth instead of increasing domestic sources of expenditure 
and growth. Indeed, the literature review and particularly the application of competing 
explanations for the economic success in East Asia demonstrated that the belief that 
trade is a necessary element of development is not universal. Yet, the results in this 
thesis support the view that the link between aid, trade and development is not direct 
and the lessons for developing countries are not clear-cut. Ultimately, it is not disputed 
that infrastructure and energy generation are important for economic development, but 
if Aid-for-trade is to achieve its development objectives, it needs to move beyond 
merely improving the generic “investment climate” (World Bank, 2005, 2010).  
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Appendix 
 
Section 1 
Figure A1 
Economic Infrastructure in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
 
 
Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2010). 
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Section 2 
 
A variety of aid statistics were available so it was felt necessary to check the robustness 
of the obtained results. The following results were obtained when using values for net 
ODA disbursements instead of net Aid-for-Trade disbursements.  
 
Table A1 
Relationships Between Aid and Other Variables 
Country ρgrowth ρFDI 
ρGDP per 
capita 
ρGNI per 
Capita 
ρGINI  ρProductivity ρExport 
Afghanistan -0.03 - - - - - 0.62 
Armenia -0.66 0.65 0.61 0.60 -0.71 - 0.22 
Azerbaijan 0.69 -0.53 0.26 0.12 - - 0.34 
Bangladesh 0.39 0.73 0.60 0.61 - - 0.65 
Bhutan -0.21 - 0.73 - - - 0.72 
Brunei Darussalam - - - - - - - 
Cambodia -0.62 0.87 0.98 0.98 -0.25 - 0.94 
China 0.07 0.65 0.69 0.69 - -0.07 0.82 
Georgia -0.81 0.36 0.77 - 0.41 - 0.76 
Hong Kong SAR, China - - - - - - - 
India -0.09 0.63 0.54 0.54 - - 0.52 
Indonesia 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.57 - 0.23 0.61 
Kazakhstan -0.89 0.74 0.79 0.72 -0.86 - 0.87 
Korea, Dem. Rep. - - - - - - -0.08 
Korea, Rep. - - - - - - - 
Kyrgyz Republic -0.37 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.00 - 0.93 
Lao PDR 0.61 0.83 0.98 0.97 - - 0.89 
Macao SAR, China - - - - - - - 
Malaysia -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.55 0.50 -0.16 
Maldives -0.59 0.28 0.06 -1.00 - - -0.19 
Mongolia -0.48 0.94 0.87 - - -0.54 0.90 
Nepal 0.58 0.60 0.94 - - - 0.53 
Pakistan -0.44 -0.10 0.56 0.63 0.50 - 0.60 
Philippines -0.07 -0.02 0.77 0.78 -0.87 -0.02 0.30 
Singapore - - - - - - - 
Sri Lanka -0.05 0.44 0.38 0.37 - - 0.50 
Tajikistan -0.80 -0.05 0.89 0.88 -0.87 - 0.50 
Thailand 0.37 0.73 0.39 0.39 0.99 -0.26 0.32 
Timor-Leste 0.56 - 0.53 - - - - 
Turkmenistan -0.14 - 0.40 0.72 - - 0.36 
Uzbekistan -0.62 - -0.65 -0.61 - - -0.64 
Vietnam -0.36 0.90 0.91 0.92 -0.91 -0.44 0.93 
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Table A2 
ΔGrowth Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant -0.2003 
(0.3587) 
0.2621 
(0.3943) 
-0.3090 
(0.4159) 
0.0871 
(0.4854) 
     
Aid -0.00064 
(0.0009) 
-0.0009 
(0.0011) 
-0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0010 
(0.0009) 
     
Capital (rescaled)   0.172 
(0.393) 
-0.420 
(2.97) 
     
Labour (rescaled)   0.170 
(0.109) 
0.914 
(1.02) 
     
Interest    -2.8495*** 
(0.7857) 
     
D2005  0.2656 
(0.9871) 
 -0.1685 
(1.068) 
     
D2006  0.0949 
(0.6144) 
 0.1198 
(0.6452) 
     
D2007  0.4288 
(0.8229) 
 0.4616 
(0.8698) 
     
D2008  -3.3473*** 
(1.0208) 
 -3.0019*** 
(0.9415) 
     
D2009  -3.5821*** 
(1.1656) 
 -3.2867*** 
(1.1408) 
     
D2010  2.9707*** 
(1.1455) 
 2.8958** 
(1.1350) 
     
Sample Size 
R
2
 
161 
.0008 
161 
0.2294 
161 
0.0045 
161 
0.2437 
     
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses 
 
As highlighted in Table A3, ODA once again has a negative effect on GDP growth, 
ceteris paribus, in all the specifications considered above. Interestingly, all the estimated 
effects are statistically significant at most conventional levels of significance but are not 
economically significant. A one million current U.S. dollar increase in aid will only 
cause a 0.0015% decline in the growth rate of a country on average keeping everything 
else constant. While this might have a substantial long-term effect due to the importance 
of compounding, this is not very large. Importantly though, the estimated co-efficient 
contradicts the theoretical model postulated by the World Bank in the Asian region. The 
result is pertinent when one realises that countries where political and social troubles are 
occurring (e.g. Afghanistan) are omitted for this analysis and so the estimated co-
efficient represents the effect of Aid in mostly stable, developing countries.  
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Table A3 
Growth Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant 7.4100*** 
(0.3914) 
8.2038  
(0.5848) 
7.1837*** 
(0.4481) 
8.1519*** 
(0.6338) 
8.5512*** 
(1.1498) 
7.5383*** 
(0.6781) 
       
Aid -0. 0012 
(0.0008) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0012 
(0.0008) 
-0. 0017** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
       
Capital 
(rescaled) 
  0.939*** 
(0.326) 
0.133*** 
(0.0372) 
0.110*** 
(0.0302) 
0.121*** 
(0.0340) 
       
Labour 
(rescaled) 
  0.612 
(1.10) 
-0.897 
(1.23) 
 -0.789 
(1.04) 
       
Interest    -0.8752 
(0.5672) 
-0.8647 
(0.5750) 
-0.1219 
(0.7991) 
       
Export 
 
     0.0198** 
(0.0089) 
       
Pop. Growth 
 
    -0.3911 
(0.7338) 
 
       
D2005  0.6220 
(0.9871) 
 0.4940 
(1.2479) 
0.5183 
(1.2393) 
0.3712 
(1.0888) 
       
D2006  0.8351 
(0.6144) 
 0.7441 
(1.4195) 
0.8008 
(1.4165) 
0.1389 
(1.1489) 
       
D2007  1.5032 
(0.8229) 
 1.3023 
(1.1708) 
1.3585 
(1.1531) 
0.5368 
(0.8934) 
       
D2008  -1.5457* 
(1.0208) 
 -1.7205* 
(0.8852) 
-1.6259* 
(0.8567) 
-2.6311*** 
(0.9536) 
       
D2009  -5.0549*** 
(1.1656) 
 -5.1532*** 
(1.2128) 
-5.0526*** 
(1.2562) 
-2.8430** 
(1.3742) 
       
D2010  -1.7352** 
(1.1455) 
 -2.0786*** 
(0.7894) 
-1.9801** 
(0.7551) 
-3.2198*** 
(0.9849) 
       
Sample Size 
R
2
 
161 
.0025 
161 
0.1872 
161 
0.0265 
161 
0.2221 
161 
0.2231 
161 
0.3469 
       
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
A remaining issue is the estimated co-efficient may be inconsistent and biased if 
variables which affect growth and are correlated with any of the independent variables 
chosen are omitted. Table A4 presents the same estimated equations as those above 
(models (1) to (6)) to assess the robustness of the estimates to a differently composed 
sample of countries as well as estimates when FDI is included.  Overall, the obtained 
co-efficients are not overly sensitive with nearly all of the co-efficients remaining the 
same sign and of a similar magnitude. The conclusion is that for general ODA, the 
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average effect is in fact negative, contradicting the World Trade Organisation’s 
predictions. The estimate is robust to model specification and self-selection biases.  
Table A4 
Extended Growth Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Constant 7.0749*** 
(0.4291) 
7.7883***  
(0.4749) 
6.7470*** 
(0.4996) 
7.6371*** 
(0. 5215) 
8.4734*** 
(1.1196) 
7.0070*** 
(0.5546) 
6.9868*** 
(0.5698) 
        
Aid -0.0009 
(0.0008) 
-0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0010 
(0.0007) 
-0. 0016** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0012* 
(0.0006) 
-0.0012* 
(0.0006) 
        
Capital 
(rescaled) 
  0.0095*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0119*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0125*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0033) 
        
Labour 
(rescaled) 
  0.1330 
(0.1098)  
-0.0272 
(0.1216) 
 -0.0256 
(0.1012) 
-0.0042 
(0.1015) 
        
Interest    -0.6596 
(0.7205) 
-0.7372 
(0.7101) 
-0.2363 
(0.8821) 
-0.1888 
(0.9135) 
        
Export 
 
     0.0205** 
(0.0102) 
0.0206** 
(0.0103) 
        
FDI       -0.0155 
(0.0240) 
        
Pop. 
Growth 
 
    -0.7186 
(0.8071) 
  
        
D2005  0.9049 
(1.3185) 
 0.8304 
(1.3291) 
0.8496 
(1.3086) 
0.6326 
(1.1091) 
0.6750 
(1.1277) 
        
D2006  1.3199 
(1.5565) 
 1.2507 
(1.5485) 
1.2892 
(1.5443) 
0.6967 
(1.2031) 
0.7003 
(1.2062) 
        
D2007  1.4110 
(1.1585) 
 1.2268 
(1.1568) 
1.2288 
(1.1128) 
0.5723 
(0.8038) 
0.6083 
(0.8032) 
        
D2008  -1.5725** 
(0.7355) 
 -1.8125** 
(0.7475) 
-1.7733** 
(0.7238) 
-
2.8390*** 
(0.9076) 
-
2.8299*** 
(0.9070) 
        
D2009  -
5.2078*** 
(1.3397) 
 -
5.2849*** 
(1.2516) 
-
5.1636*** 
(1.3400) 
-2.8354** 
(1.3950) 
-2.8761** 
(1.3949) 
        
D2010  -1.6194** 
(0.7421) 
 -
1.9525*** 
(0.7213) 
-
1.8961*** 
(0.6864) 
-
3.2920*** 
(0.9889) 
-
3.2436*** 
(0.9648) 
        
Sample 
Size 
R
2
 
161 
 
0.0017 
161 
 
0.1994 
161 
 
0.0361 
161 
 
0.2221 
161 
 
0.2474 
161 
 
0.3753 
161 
 
0.3760 
        
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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